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PROPERTY AND THE TRUE-SALE DOCTRINE
Heather Hughes*
ABSTRACT:
The true-sale doctrine governs financial transactions involving hundreds of
billions of dollars each year. Yet this doctrine is confused, unsettled and
subject to differing approaches from state to state: it lacks normative
foundation and it lacks coherence. The true-sale doctrine determines the fate
of investors asserting ownership of securitized assets at the expense of
unsecured creditors, such as employees. It distinguishes assignments to
secure loans (leaving assets potentially reachable by unsecured creditors),
from outright sales (making assets the exclusive property of investors). A
rich literature addresses the efficiency of securitization. But scholars and
policy-makers have failed to sufficiently relate positions on securitization’s
efficiency to normative positions on the true-sale doctrine. This Article maps
arguments about securitization’s efficiency to formulations of the true-sale
doctrine, to enable normative direction. It then relates true-sale rules to
property-law concepts as strategy for coherence. The true-sale doctrine has
not received scholarly attention in accord with its importance. This Article,
through mapping descriptions of securitization’s efficiency to formulations
of true-sale rules, demonstrates why the doctrine matters. Successful truesale rules must be grounded in a conception of property that can explain and
justify investors’ rights of exclusion against a company’s unsecured
creditors. States’ property laws should confer rights of exclusion in
securitized assets in a way that is (i) justified, given potential effects of
exclusion on creditors in weak bargaining positions, and (ii) clear, given the
costs of uncertainty in the legal foundations of market-dominant
transactions.
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INTRODUCTION
The true-sale doctrine has been described as “the holy grail of the
securitization market, a market in which hundreds of billions of dollars flow
in transactions structured around constantly evolving ideas of what a true
sale means.”1 This doctrine determines whether securitized assets constitute
part of a company’s bankruptcy estate. It distinguishes assignments to secure
loans from true sales, after which assets are the property of a special purpose
entity2 and belong exclusively to investors. The true-sale doctrine is at the
heart of receivables securitizations.3 Bankruptcy and, in some instances,
accounting outcomes4 affecting employees, retirees and other creditors hinge
1. Peter V. Pantaleo et al., Rethinking the Role of Recourse in the Sale of Financial
Assets, 52 BUS. LAW. 159, 161 (1996).
2. This entity isolates assets from bankruptcy risk. See infra text accompanying notes
19, 58. In some instances, the entity is also off-balance sheet. See also Thomas E. Plank,
Securitization of Aberrant Contract Receivables, 89 CHICAGO-KENT L. REV. 171, 187 n. 56
(2013).
3. See infra Part I.A. for a definition and description of receivables securitization.
4. See Fin. Accounting Standards Bd. [hereinafter FASB], Accounting Standards
Codification, Topic 860, Transfers and Servicing (2009) (replacing FASB, Statement of
Financial Accounting Standards [hereinafter FAS] No. 166, which replaced FAS 140);
Summary of Statement of No. 140: Accounting for Transfers and Servicing of Financial
Assets and Extinguishments of Liabilities – A Replacement of FASB Statement No. 125, FASB
(Sept. 2000), http://www.fasb.org/summary/stsum140.shtml [https://perma.cc/N896-ADWP]
(last visited June 24, 2016).
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on its correct administration.5 Yet this doctrine is confused, unsettled and
subject to differing approaches from state to state.6
The true-sale doctrine has not received scholarly attention in accord
with its importance. The doctrine can appear to be of little consequence:
when a court interprets a deal that purports to sell assets to be instead a loan
secured by the assets, the result is that the investors who claimed an
ownership interest have instead a first-priority security interest. The
investors “win” anyway. They just have to contend with bankruptcy
procedures that impose costs on them. This view underestimates the truesale doctrine. First, recent literature has shown that whether parties make
assets bankruptcy remote (by assigning them in a true sale) affects the
efficiency of decisions about continuation and liquidation in bankruptcy.7
Second, assets included in a bankruptcy estate, even if subject to a firstpriority security interest, may be reachable to secure continuation financing
or to support operations of the debtor—such as wage and benefits obligations
and payments to suppliers—for some period of time, so long as investors
have adequate protection.8
5. For discussion of the centrality of the true-sale concept to securitization, see infra
text accompanying notes 53-57.
6. See infra Part II. The laws governing secured transactions are highly uniform, thanks
to Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) Article 9. UCC Article 9 governs receivables
securitizations, in the sense that all conveyances of receivables must comply with UCC Article
9 formalities to be enforceable. See U.C.C. § 9-109(a)(1), (3) (stating that Article 9 applies to
transactions, regardless of form, that create a security interest by contract, and also to sales of
accounts, chattel paper, payment intangibles, and promissory notes). But the question of
whether a given receivables conveyance constitutes an assignment that secures an
obligation—as opposed to an outright sale—is governed by the true-sale doctrine, apart from
UCC Article 9. See U.C.C. §9-109 cmt. 4 (noting that “neither this Article nor the definition
of ‘security interest’ . . . delineates how a particular transaction is to be classified,” and as
such “[t]hat issue is left to the courts”). See generally U.C.C. § 9 (2010). The National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL) drafted and periodically
revises the model UCC in conjunction with the American Law Institute (ALI). All U.S.
jurisdictions have enacted UCC Article 9. Unless otherwise indicated, citations herein to the
UCC are to the official text and comments of the ALI and NCCUSL. Note that some may
question whether Article 9 governs receivables securitizations in which the transfer of
receivables from the originator to the special purpose entity (SPE) takes the form of a capital
contribution in exchange for equity in the SPE, as opposed to a sale for cash. See Kenneth C.
Kettering, True Sale of Receivables: A Purposive Analysis, 16 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 511,
513 n.5 (2008). This Article does not engage this question of statutory construction, other than
to note that UCC Article 9 does not limit “sales” to transactions in which parties exchange
assets for cash.
7. See, e.g., Kenneth Ayotte & Stav Gaon, Asset-Backed Securities: Costs and Benefits
of Bankruptcy Remoteness, 24 REV. FIN. STUD. 1299 (2011) (arguing that bankruptcy
remoteness is valuable to ABS investors, based on findings that, after LTV Steel, Chapter 11eligible originators saw an increase in spreads that Chapter-11 ineligible originators did not).
8. See 11 U.S.C. § 361 (adequate protection may be established with “an additional or
replacement lien to the extent that such stay, use, sale, lease, or grant results in a decrease in
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A rich literature addresses the efficiency and desirability of
securitization, taking on the question of whether and when securitized assets
should be bankruptcy-remote.9 Yet scholars and policy-makers have largely
failed to relate positions on securitization’s efficiency to normative positions
on the true-sale doctrine.10 This Article relates scholars’ arguments about
the value of bankruptcy remoteness and the desirability of securitization to
different formulations of true-sale rules.
Many identify securitization as integral to the causes of the 2008
financial crisis.11 Lawmakers have largely focused, since then, on federal
regulation designed to: minimize moral hazard associated with off-balance
sheet financing; require that originators and underwriters keep “skin in the
game” when creating and marketing asset-backed securities; and ensure that
consumers can make informed choices about financial products inspired by

value of such entity’s interest in such property”); § 363(b)-(c) (allowing the bankruptcy trustee
to use or assign property of the estate in certain circumstances); § 363(e) (providing that the
court will prohibit or condition such use of property of the estate as is necessary to provide
adequate protection to an entity that has an interest in property used or assigned); § 364(d)(1)
(allowing the bankruptcy court to “authorize the obtaining of credit or the incurring of debt
secured by a senior or equal lien on property of the estate that is subject to a lien only if (A)
the trustee is unable to obtain such credit otherwise; and (B) there is adequate protection of
the interest of the holder of the lien on the property of the estate on which such senior or equal
lien is proposed to be granted.”). See also Melissa B. Jacoby & Edward J. Janger, Tracing
Equity: Realizing and Allocating Value in Chapter 11 at 3, 11, 13-24 (challenging the
contention that there is no need to consider unsecured creditors’ claims given the prevalence
of under-secured “blanket liens”); Plank, supra note 2, at 177-78.
9. See infra Part I.B.
10. Scholars discuss the efficiency and desirability of securitization, and they discuss the
true-sale doctrine and the fact that securitization’s efficiencies are a function of the legal
isolation of securitized assets. But they do not analyze or make explicit the relationship
between positions on securitization’s efficiency and formulations of true-sale rules, as this
Article does. See, e.g., Steven L. Schwarcz, Securitization Post-Enron, 25 CARDOZO L. REV.
1539, 1543-48, 1553-74 (2004); Thomas E. Plank, The Security of Securitization and the
Future of Security, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 1655, 1667-69, 1675 (2004). The most direct analysis
of the relationship between true-sale rules and policy arguments about securitization is found
in Edward J. Janger, The Death of Secured Lending, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 1759 (2004). Janger
focuses on the dangers and costs of statutory efforts to abolish the true-sale doctrine, pointing
out that this doctrine prevents negative externalities such as excessive cost transfer to
unsecured creditors, concealed liens, and balance sheet distortion. See id. at 1773. This Article
departs from Janger’s in that it (i) more extensively maps arguments about the efficiency of
securitization and bankruptcy remoteness to formulations of true-sale rules, (ii) focuses on the
relevance of property-law concepts for developing more coherent and justifiable true-sale
rules, and (iii) incorporates recent literature and developments.
11. See, e.g., Lipson, infra note 50, at 1249 (noting that “even those who are not hostile
to securitization would now seem to support this view” that “‘while there were multiple causes
of the subprime boom and collapse, securitization itself was a significant cause of both,’”
quoting Kurt Eggert). See also Kurt Eggert, The Great Collapse: How Securitization Caused
the Subprime Meltdown, 41 CONN. L. REV. 1257, 1262 (2012).
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and funded through capital markets.12 Meanwhile, the state-level, privatelaw infrastructure of financial transactions, such as the true-sale doctrine,
contains under-explored opportunities to improve market governance.13
True-sale rules should be clarified and fortified to facilitate positive—and
mitigate negative—externalities of securitization.14 This Article is a type of
rule-of-law project. Federal regulatory priorities will fluctuate. States’
property laws should determine the bankruptcy-remoteness of securitized
assets in a way that is (i) justified, given the effects of such determination on
creditors in weak bargaining positions (such as employees); and (ii) clear,
given the volatility that can follow from uncertainty surrounding the legal
underpinnings of market-dominant transactions.
As discussed below, recently, commentators have called for a
“property-based” standard for identifying true sales of receivables.15 A truesale doctrine explicitly rooted in property law would be better than
formulations currently in force in various jurisdictions. But a successful
approach to the true-sale doctrine must be grounded in a conception of
property that can explain and justify investors’ rights of exclusion against a
company’s unsecured creditors.16
12. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 12 U.S.C. § 5301
(2006 & Supp. 2011).
13. See Heather Hughes, Financial Product Complexity, Moral Hazard, and the Private
Law, 20 STAN. J. L. BUS. & FIN. 179, 206, 220 (2015). Compare Ronald J. Mann, The Rise of
State Bankruptcy-Directed Legislation, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 1805 (2004) (discussing who
should decide, as between state commercial law and federal bankruptcy law, policy issues
surrounding securitization), with Janger, supra note 10 (discussing the importance of the truesale doctrine, asserting that it “has a crucial regulatory component that enhances both financial
transparency and helps maintain proper investment incentives”).
14. Positive externalities of securitization are the efficiencies it can produce. See infra
text accompanying note 66. Negative externalities of securitization include costs externalized
to unsecured creditors in some contexts, raising both efficiency and fairness concerns. See
infra text accompanying note 69. Different formulations of true-sale rules affect the extent to
which legal isolation of securitized assets produces efficiencies, or conversely, aggravates
negative externalities. See infra Part I.B. When securitization transactions involve an
assignment that is a disguised security interest (not a true sale), negative externalities also
include secret liens and accounting distortions. See Janger, supra note 10, at 1773.
15. See Steven L. Harris & Charles W. Mooney, Jr., When Is a Dog’s Tail Not a Leg?:
A Property-Based Methodology for Distinguishing Sales of Receivables from Security
Interests That Secure an Obligation, 82 U. CIN. L. REV. 1029 (2014). See infra Part II.C.
Rather than consider factors such as recourse or price to classify a receivables conveyance,
these scholars argue, we should ask only whether the originator retains an interest in the
receivables that secures an obligation. Id. The term “originator” refers in this Article to a
company generating and securitizing assets. See infra Part I.A for a description of receivables
securitization and the various parties thereto.
16. Such justification may be, for example, that the efficiencies securitization produces
benefit investors and unsecured creditors alike; therefore, minimizing re-characterization risk
with statutory true-sale safe harbors that exclude unsecured creditors from securitized assets
is justified. By contrast, if securitization inefficiently extracts a subsidy from non-adjusting
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In other words, the true-sale doctrine lacks clear connection to a policy
justification (such as efficiency), and is inconsistent and sometimes
incoherent. This Article maps arguments about securitization’s efficiency
and desirability to formulations of the true-sale doctrine to enable policy or
values-driven understandings of the doctrine.17 It then situates true-sale rules
vis-à-vis the property-law concepts of numerus clausus and rights of
exclusion, as a strategy for both coherence and normative direction.18
“Securitization” is a broad and diverse category of transactions.19
Different types of securitization present different policy concerns.20 The
relevance and consequences of the true-sale doctrine are greater in some
securitization contexts than in others.21 This Article focuses on true sales of
receivables22 for creation of asset-backed securities or “ABS.” Whether a
financial transaction is an outright sale of assets, rather than a security
interest that secures an obligation (a “SISO”),23 has important consequences
creditors in some contexts, then in order to justify exclusion of such creditors from securitized
assets, true-sale rules could require fair-market-value pricing and terms for the assets. See text
accompanying notes 99, 105.
17. See infra Part I.
18. See infra Part III.
19. Securitization is the practice of selling assets to an SPE and then having the SPE
issue securities backed by the assets. Securitization can reduce costs of capital for the seller;
once the assets are transferred to the SPE they are isolated from other creditors of the seller.
The SPE is set up to be bankruptcy remote from the seller. For more precise and thorough
definitions and discussion, see infra Part I.
20. For example, securitization of residential mortgages facilitates originate-todistribute lending practices that can aggravate moral hazard and create concerns for
consumers entering into mortgage loans. Synthetic securitizations—re-securitizations or
“ABS CDOs”—can be very complex and can create securities of specious value, undermining
financial transparency and stability among the institutions that create and trade them. See infra
text accompanying notes 22, 56.
21. For example, in a remittance or future flow securitization the true-sale opinion serves
a different purpose than it does in a receivables securitization—namely, to establish that under
the laws of the originator’s jurisdiction the transfer of the first right to receive remittances
accomplished a sale to a foreign purchaser. The goal is to minimize political risk, not to isolate
the assets from those of the originator such that a U.S. court would find the assets to be
unreachable by the originator’s creditors. See Heather Hughes, Securitization of Worker
Remittances, in MOBILISING CAPITAL FOR EMERGING MARKETS: WHAT CAN STRUCTURED
FINANCE CONTRIBUTE 101 (Doris Köhn ed., 2011).
22. “Receivables” refers to all monetary obligations owed to a company by its debtors
or customers. These can include invoices for sales of goods, credit card payments, loan
obligations, contracts for services, or the like. This category typically does not include
mortgage loans. Receivables securitizations, creating ABS, are similar, but distinct from
securitization of real estate mortgages, creating mortgage-backed securities (“MBS”). See
infra Part I.A. Further, ABS are typically collateralized by primary payment rights—a
company’s actual receivables—rather than by synthetic or derivative rights, which typically
back collateralized debt obligations (“CDOs”). See infra text accompanying note 56.
23. The Uniform Commercial Code definition of “security interest” includes interests
that do not secure obligations, such as consignments and sales of certain financial assets
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for creditors such as employees or retirees with interests in a company’s
bankruptcy estate. Assets assigned to secure a loan are part of the estate.
Even though a secured investor may have a first priority claim, pending
resolution of the proceedings the bankruptcy trustee or debtor-in-possession
can (i) permit the company to draw on the assets to service wage and benefit
obligations,24 (ii) offer adequate protection to investors, and (iii) assign
interests in the assets to continuation financers.25 Assets sold, however, are
no longer property of the company; the company no longer has any property
interest in the assets to which a bankruptcy trustee’s lien could attach.26
In most jurisdictions, the true-sale doctrine is governed by confusing
and divergent case law.27 Some states override the doctrine with “AssetBacked Securities Facilitation Acts,” or “ABS statutes,” that deem all
assignments of receivables for purposes of securitization to be sales,
regardless of economic substance.28 These statutes confer “sale” status on
transactions the economic substance of which would not otherwise warrant
that status.29 In securitizations in which the originator is a bank subject to
the Federal Deposit Insurance Act, FDIC rules, which contain safe-harbor
provisions and reference accounting standards, may determine the status of
securitized assets.30
In an attempt to clarify and improve this area of law, Steven L. Harris
and Charles W. Mooney, Jr., propose what they call “a property-based
methodology” for distinguishing sales of receivables from SISOs. 31 While
included within the scope of Article 9, under § 9-109(a). As such, it is necessary to distinguish
“security interests,” as defined by the code, from SISOs. See U.C.C. § 1-201(b)(35). Some
readers may assume that the term “security interest” implies an assignment that secures an
obligation, but this is not the case in commercial law.
24. Cf. Plank, infra note 132, at 630-31.
25. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 364(d)(1), 541.
26. Note that a bankruptcy trustee may claim broad, equitable powers in initially finding
“property interests” for purposes of attachment pending resolution of state-law questions
about the status and scope of a debtor’s property interests. Compare 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1)
(stating that upon filing of a bankruptcy petition an estate is created that consists of “all legal
or equitable interests of the debtor in property as of the commencement of the case”), with
United States v. Whiting Pools, Inc., 462 U.S. 198, 204-06 (1983), and In re LTV Steel
Company, Inc., 274 B.R. 278 (2001).
27. See Harris & Mooney, infra note 31, at 1031. See also infra Part II.
28. See ALA. CODE § 35-10A-2(a)(1) (West 2016); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, §§ 2701A2703A (West 2016); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10:9-109(e) (West 2016); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 1109.75 (West 2016); N.C. GEN. STATE. §§ 53-425, 53-426 (West 2015); S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS § 54-1-10 (West 2016); TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN § 9-109(e) (West 2015).
29. See infra Part II.B.1.
30. See 12 CFR 360.6(b). See also infra text accompanying notes 214-219; comments
from T. Plank (noting that FDIC rules govern only a minority of bank-sponsored
securitizations).
31. See Steven L. Harris & Charles W. Mooney, Jr., When Is a Dog’s Tail Not a Leg?:
A Property-Based Methodology for Distinguishing Sales of Receivables from Security
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many consider the level of recourse between the seller and purchaser of
receivables, and the adequacy of purchase price, to be central factors in
determining whether a transaction is a sale or a loan,32 Harris and Mooney
argue that these factors are not sufficient grounds for characterizing a deal.
The only relevant questions, they assert, are whether the purported seller has
retained an “economic interest” in the assets and whether the interest
transferred to the purchaser secures an obligation.33 This standard is
established in the true-lease context and should, they argue, apply to
receivables transactions as well.34
Harris and Mooney find a property interest wherever the purported
seller retains an economic interest in receivables, and finds no property
interest where the seller retains no economic interest. But they fail to offer
sufficient explication of, or justification for, such interest, or to adequately
address important distinctions between equipment leasing and receivables
securitization.35 This Article finds Harris and Mooney’s proposal to be
promising but incomplete; they are correct to argue for an approach to true
sales that is explicitly rooted in property law.36
Part I defines “receivables securitization.” It then presents literature on
efficiency and bankruptcy remoteness, and on the relationship between
accounting standards and legal rules. It explains why the true-sale doctrine
matters, the policy issues that it implicates, and the bankruptcy and
accounting outcomes it affects. An extensive body of literature discussing
the efficiency of securitization reveals conflicting viewpoints.37 So far,
scholars have not explicitly analyzed the relationship between arguments
about the efficiency of securitization and normative positions on the truesale doctrine. For example, one might think that if securitization is efficient,
in a Kaldor-Hicks sense,38 then ABS statutes that eliminate recharacterization risk would promote efficiency. This view, however, fails to
consider the (i) dynamic relationship between law and markets,39 and (ii)
inefficiencies in bankruptcy that an over-broad ABS statute can aggravate,
surrounding decisions about continuation versus liquidation and debtor-inpossession financing.40 Part I presents this and other observations
concerning the relationship between arguments about securitization and
Interests That Secure and Obligation, 82 U. CIN. L. REV. 1029 (2014).
32. See infra Part II.A.
33. See Harris & Mooney, supra note 31.
34. Id.
35. See infra text accompanying notes 232, 234-36.
36. See infra Part III.
37. See infra text accompanying notes 66-72.
38. See infra text accompanying note 70.
39. See infra text accompanying note 79.
40. See infra text accompanying notes 87-92.
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policy justifications for different forms of true-sale rules.
Part II presents current approaches to the true-sale doctrine and explains
why they are problematic. It analyzes recourse and price as crucial factors
in true-sale determinations, and discusses existing statutory approaches. It
then describes and critiques Harris and Mooney’s “property-based
methodology” for making true-sale determinations, finding it to be an
important, but incomplete, contribution.
Part III discusses the value of establishing a method for making truesale determinations that is more overtly “property-based.” Deal provisions
that create recourse, express purchase price, or ensure that one or the other
party receives surplus collections are enforceable as a matter of contract law.
The true-sale doctrine is necessarily a matter of property law: it delineates
the scope of interest that a transaction creates. A more explicit, propertybased framing of true-sale rules would improve the doctrine’s coherence and
normative grounding.41 Part III identifies two property-law concepts—
numerus clausus and rights of exclusion—that are integral to the true-sale
doctrine, and describes their relevance in receivables conveyances.
Understanding how these concepts apply in the receivables securitization
context could lead to the development of better approaches to true-sale
questions.
Part IV identifies Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) Article 9 and
bankruptcy law as potential sites for clarification of the true-sale doctrine.
Two states already enact true-sale rules within UCC Article 9.42 To provide
an alternative example, Part IV.A sketches possibilities for Article 9
provisions that would codify the relevance of price in true-sale
determinations. This Article does not seek to establish that price should be
determinative in true-sale analyses. Rather, it relates positions on
securitization’s efficiency and the value of bankruptcy remoteness to
normative positions on true-sale rules. For example, if lawmakers sought to
assure a fair purchase price for securitized assets, because they believed that
doing so would protect the interest of unsecured creditors, they could pursue
this objective by revising UCC Article 9. Part IV.A identifies sections of
UCC Article 9 in which lawmakers could express such objectives. Part IV.B
then discusses the relationship between bankruptcy law and property law
(including proposed section 91243 of the 2001 bankruptcy reform bill44).
Federal bankruptcy law could be a viable site for clarification of true-sale
41. See infra Part III.
42. Texas and Louisiana enacted ABS statutes as non-uniform UCC Article 9 section 9109(e).
43. This section was rescinded in 2002. See infra text accompanying note 281.
44. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 2001, S. 220, H.R. 333, 107th Cong.; H.R. 333, 107th
Cong. § 912(i) (2001).
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rules, despite the general principle, in bankruptcy, of looking to state law for
determination of property interests.45
Ultimately, the true-sale doctrine is meant to align property rights and
risk. Characterizing a deal according to its economic substance prevents
parties from engaging in regulatory arbitrage. Transacting parties should not
be able to avoid bankruptcy rules or UCC Article 9 rules for disposition of
collateral by simply calling their transaction by the form that gives the
investor the most advantageous legal position, despite the rights and
obligations of the parties and impacts on any third parties affected by the
deal.
I.

WHY THE TRUE-SALE DOCTRINE MATTERS

Some downplay the importance of the true-sale doctrine, pointing out
that regardless of how true-sale disputes are resolved, investors prevail.
They prevail either because they purchased assets in a true sale such that the
assets are bankruptcy-remote, or because they purchased a security interest
in the assets that entitles them to recovery, in bankruptcy, in advance of all
other creditors.46 This part explains how this view underestimates the
consequences of true-sale rules. It relates true-sale rules to arguments about
efficiency, securitization, and bankruptcy-remoteness—a task that legal
scholars have largely neglected.47
People use the term “securitization” to refer to deals involving many
different types of assets,48 from tangible property, such as inventory, to rather
abstract intangibles, such as remittance cash flows.49 This part defines
“receivables securitization”—a concept that is more precise than the general
(and sometimes loosely used) term “securitization.”50 It presents current

45. See infra text accompanying note 266.
46. See Jacoby & Janger, supra note 8 (presenting the concept of “equitable realization”
to describe how Chapter 11 treats realization value in bankruptcy, finding that value created
or preserved by Chapter 11 benefits all stakeholders).
47. See Janger, supra note 10 (noting how, unlike other scholars, Janger analyzes the
relationship between true-sale rules and the efficiency effects of securitization transactions).
Again, to date, scholars focus on efficiency and fairness questions surrounding securitization,
and they discuss the true-sale doctrine, but they leave largely to un-vetted implication the
relationship between these rules and the efficiency effects that follow. For a summary of how
this Article’s scope and analysis departs from Janger’s, see supra note 10.
48. Jonathan Lipson succinctly states that the essential elements common to all
securitization are three: “(1) inputs, (2) a particular structure, and (3) outputs.” Lipson, infra
note 50, at 1239.
49. For a description of remittance securitizations (i.e., securitization of “diversified
payment rights,” or “future flow” transactions), as compared to more common receivables
securitizations, see Hughes supra note 21.
50. See Jonathan C. Lipson, (Re)Defining Securitization, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 1229, 1232-
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literature on the efficiency of securitization and the value of bankruptcy
remoteness.51 Finally, it discusses the relationship between the law
governing receivables securitizations and the accounting treatment of these
deals.52
A. Receivables securitization
“Receivables” refers to all monetary obligations owed to a company by
its debtors or customers. These can include invoices for sales of goods,
credit card payments, loan obligations, contracts for services, or the like.53
Receivables appear on a company’s balance sheet; and they include all debts
owed to the company, even if they are not currently due. While “receivables”
includes loans owed to a company, mortgage loans54 typically are not
included in definitions of receivables.55 Mortgage loans are frequently
pooled and securitized, creating “mortgage-backed securities” or “MBS.”
“Asset-backed securities” or “ABS” refer to securities collateralized by
receivables or other financial assets, other than mortgage loans. In this
Article, “receivables securitization” means a securitization of primary
payment rights,56 derived from financial assets other than mortgages, to
create ABS.
In the wake of the 2008 financial crisis, mortgage securitization
received much attention, due to its relationship to the residential housing
market. Mortgage-backed securities have always been a significant part of
33 (2012) (identifying a lack of definition for the term “securitization” in secondary sources
and in laws governing securitization, and arguing for a coherent definition). Lipson finds
“over two dozen regulatory and statutory definitions of the word ‘securitization’,”
compounded by various definitions used by market actors and commentators. Id. at 1257.
51. Kenneth Ayotte & Stav Gaon, Asset-Backed Securities: Costs and Benefits of
Bankruptcy Remoteness, 24 REV. FIN. STUD. 1299 (2011) (arguing that bankruptcy remoteness
is valuable to ABS investors, based on findings that, after LTV Steel, Chapter 11-eligible
originators saw an increase in spreads that Chapter-11 ineligible originators did not).
52. See infra text accompanying notes 122-50.
53. See U.C.C. § 9-102(a) (defining of accounts, chattel paper, general intangibles, etc.).
54. These are loans secured by real property, governed by state mortgage law, as opposed
to loans that are unsecured or that are secured by personal property, governed by UCC Article
9.
55. John Downes & Jordan Elliot Goodman, Receivables, DICTIONARY OF FINANCE AND
INVESTMENT TERMS (7th ed. 2006).
56. Receivables are primary payments rights that back ABS, as opposed to synthetic or
derivative rights that back collateralized debt obligations or CDOs. See Lipson supra note 11,
at 1233-35, 1271-72 (defining true securitization as a transaction in which an SPE buys
primary payment rights); Steven L. Schwarcz, Essay: Protecting Financial Markets: Lessons
from the Subprime Mortgage Meltdown, 93 MINN. L. REV. 373, 376-77 (2008) (describing
distinctions among types of collateralized debt instruments by sketching the procedures in
securitization and ABS CDO transactions).
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the securitization market. But by the early 2000s, receivables securitizations
(involving various kinds of payment rights) had overtaken residential real
property mortgages as a generator of new securitizations.57
“Receivables securitization” refers to transactions in which a company
(i) forms a legally distinct entity, called a “special purpose entity” or
“SPE”58; (ii) conveys receivables to the SPE; and (iii) raises capital by having
the SPE issue securities collateralized by the receivables to investors. The
company securitizing its receivables is called the “originator”—it is
originating the assets conveyed to the SPE for purposes of securitization.
The SPE is bankruptcy remote from the originator—it is a legally separate
entity that meets standards for independence that assure it would not be
consolidated with the originator in bankruptcy. In order to be bankruptcy
remote, the SPE must (among other things) have at least one independent
director. Investors may rely on “non-consolidation” legal opinion letters
from counsel to the originator, in determining that an SPE is in fact
bankruptcy remote from the originator parent company.
In order for the receivables themselves to be bankruptcy remote, the
originator must convey them to the SPE in a sale transaction (rather than a
transaction that creates a SISO). This is the aspect of receivables
securitization that is governed by the true-sale doctrine and discussed
throughout this Article.
In order to raise capital, the SPE issues debt collateralized by the
receivables it acquired from the originator, in the form of asset-backed
securities. Securitizations involve the issuance of shares, bonds, trust
certificates, or other instruments, so long as they are recognizable to capital
markets and have secondary market value.59 This Article uses the term
“asset-backed securities” to refer to any of these. The SPE acquires and
holds a pool of receivables and then issues securities to investors. Investors
purchase the securities, giving the SPE cash that it passes through to the
originator as the purchase price for the receivables.
Receivables finance has long been a crucial source of capital for
business.60 In recent decades, receivables securitization has become integral

57. See Lipson, supra note 10, at 1248, citing Credit Risk Retention, 76 Fed. Reg. 24,094,
tbl. B (Apr. 29, 2011) (depicting “Securitization Market Share by Asset Class” between 20052009, and noting that new securitizations had overtaken the RMBS market share).
58. We might also refer to this entity as a special purpose vehicle or “SPV.” In some
contexts, one might use terms such as “securitization trust,” or simply “issuer,” to refer to the
special purpose entity in a securitization facility.
59. See Lipson supra note 10, at 1240-41 (discussing how securitizations involve the
issuance of bonds and shares, among other financial instruments, that are deemed to have a
secondary market value).
60. See White & Brunstad, infra note 156, at 158.
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to capital markets.61 This development raises specific policy concerns.
Originators that generate and securitize receivables can have many
employees and retirees who are unsecured creditors in bankruptcy.
Numerous commentators question the efficiency of receivables
securitization, arguing that it permits originators and investors to extract a
subsidy from, or artificially depress interest rates at the expense of,
unsecured creditors.62 Others defend receivables securitization on efficiency
terms.63 In addition, some maintain that it is unfair to permit originators and
investors to externalize costs on to third parties, such as employees or tort
claimants, who lack the capacity to alter their rate of return in response to
the presence of investors with a superior claim to assets.64 Others disagree
and do not find that securitization presents fairness concerns: these deals
involve assignments of assets that exclude third parties just like any other
property conveyance, such that there is no fairness concern specific to this
deal type that justifies questioning its structure.65 Such policy concerns
implicate the true-sale doctrine, as elaborated below.
B. Bankruptcy remote finance: costs and benefits
This section relates scholars’ arguments about the value of bankruptcy
remoteness and the efficiency of securitization to the true-sale doctrine.

61. See e.g., Iman Anabtawi & Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating Ex Post: How Law Can
Address the Inevitability of Financial Failure, 92 TEX. L. REV. 75, 110 (2013) (discussing
ABS and the regulatory reaction to the financial crisis:
The Federal Reserve further undertook to support the consumer asset-backed
securities (ABS) market through the Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility
(TALF). ABS are securities similar to MBS but collateralized by nonmortgage
loans, such as automobile, credit card, and student loan receivables. The ABS
markets historically have funded a substantial share of credit to consumers and
businesses. Concerned that ‘continued disruption of [the ABS] markets could
significantly limit the availability of credit to households and . . . businesses and
thereby contribute to further weakening of U.S. economic activity,’ the Federal
Reserve used TALF to provide nonrecourse funding to borrowers willing to issue
new ABS.
(quoting Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. (Nov. 25, 2008),
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/20081125a.htm
[https://perma.cc/4YV6-HSUS] (citations omitted)).
62. See infra text accompanying note 68.
63. See infra text accompanying note 66.
64. See infra text accompanying note 67.
65. See infra text accompanying note 66.
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1. Securitization and efficiency generally
Securitization transactions produce efficiencies. They enable lower
costs of capital, risk pooling, and liquidity for originators; they enable
precise matching of risk profiles to risk preferences, diversification and risk
spreading for investors.66 At the same time, securitization transactions can
produce inefficiencies arising from the exclusion of originators’ nonadjusting creditors67 from securitized assets.68 This Article does not seek to
advance the debate over whether, and when, securitization is efficient.
Rather, it seeks to align arguments about the efficiency of securitization with
formulations of the true-sale doctrine in order to facilitate policy discussions
about what true-sale rules should look like.
In a nutshell, some commentators contend that securitization is
inefficient because it permits originators and investors to extract a subsidy
from the originators’ non-adjusting creditors, externalizing costs onto
them.69 Others argue that because securitization lowers costs of capital, it is
66. See, e.g., Steven L. Schwarcz, Securitization Post-Enron, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 1539,
1541 (2004) (describing the benefits securitization can have for originators, such as lowercost financing, preferable risk allocation, and liquidity); Janger supra note 10, at 1770
(arguing that securitization benefits investors and borrowers).
67. Non-adjusting creditors are unsecured creditors who are not in a position to adjust
their rate of return in response to changes in capital structure or financial condition of the
debtor. Non-adjusting creditors include employees and many trade creditors. Tort claimants
are non-adjusting creditors that are also non-consenting—that is, they do not consent to extend
credit to the debtor in the first place.
68. See Lynn M. LoPucki, The Death of Liability, 106 YALE L.J. 1, 23–30 (1996)
(describing how a company could divest itself of its assets through asset securitization but
still use those assets during the course of its business); Lynn M. LoPucki, The Irrefutable
Logic of Judgment Proofing, 52 STAN. L. REV. 55, 59–67 (1999) (analyzing Steven L.
Schwarcz’s response to LoPucki’s The Death of Liability to refute the argument that the costs
of judgement-proofing outweigh the benefits). But see Steven L. Schwarcz, The Inherent
Irrationality of Judgment Proofing, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1999) (arguing, through an economic
analysis, that judgment-proofing techniques, such as LoPucki’s, may not be standard
practice); James J. White, Corporate Judgment Proofing: A Response to Lynn LoPucki’s The
Death of Liability, 107 YALE L.J. 1363 (1998) (arguing that American businesses are making
themselves increasingly judgment-proof). See also Yair Listokin, Is Secured Debt Used to
Redistribute Value from Tort Claimants in Bankruptcy? An Empirical Analysis, 57 DUKE L.J.
1037 (2008) (finding that firms with high uninsured tort risk do not issue more secured debt
than other firms, negating the redistribution theory of secured credit). Cf. Richard Squire, The
Case for Symmetry in Creditors’ Rights, 118 YALE L.J. 806, 838-42 (2009) (stating that debtor
opportunism in shifting costs to non-adjusting creditors is the most likely explanation for the
persistence of asymmetrical asset partitioning).
69. See, e.g., Lois R. Lupica, Asset Securitization: The Unsecured Creditor’s
Perspective, 76 TEX. L. REV. 595 (1998) (identifying arguments against the efficiency of
structured finance). This critique is rooted in “the puzzle of secured credit.” The puzzle grew
out of applications to secured lending of Franco Modigliani’s and Merton Miller’s theory that
the value of a firm is not affected by its capital structure in a perfect market. See Franco
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efficient in Kaldor-Hicks terms, and benefits originators, investors, and
unsecured creditors as well.70
Note that the arguments referenced here about efficiencies and
inefficiencies of securitization pertain, to a large extent, to secured loans as
well.71 Debates over the efficiency of UCC Article 9’s full-priority secured
Modigliani & Merton Miller, The Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance, and the Theory of
Investment, 48 AM. ECON. REV. 261 (1958) (arguing that, under certain assumptions, the value
of the firm does not change based on whether it is financed by debt or equity). For a concise
summary, see William W. Bratton, CORPORATE FINANCE CASES AND MATERIALS 481–85 (5th
ed. 2003) (summarizing the Modigliani-Miller thesis and assumptions by comparing it to the
traditional approach in forming valuations and leverage). It may appear that secured credit
lowers costs of capital by lowering interest rates available to debtors that issue collateral.
However, in theory, altering the capital structure of a corporate entity should not change its
value. Id. Investors adjust the interest rate charged for debt and the amount they will pay for
an equity interest to reflect the riskiness of the investment. See Modigliani & Miller, supra
note 69 (supporting the theory that debtors have no interest rate based reason to borrow on a
secured basis if capital costs are the same). This raises the question: if an entity cannot change
its average costs of capital by altering its capital structure, then why do debtors take on the
transaction costs associated with issuing security for loans? See generally Alan Schwarz, The
Continuing Puzzle of Secured Debt, 37 VAND. L. REV. 1051 (1984) (analyzing academic
arguments about justifications for security in an effort to find answers to the secured debt
puzzle). Two general possibilities may explain this puzzle: (1) secured credit produces
efficiencies (see Schwarcz, supra note 66); and (2) secured credit exports costs to third parties
(see Bebchuck & Fried, infra note 71, at 864 (arguing that security interests under the full
priority rule have distributional effects that create inefficiencies)). David Carlson has rejected
the “puzzle of secured credit.” He contends that (1) Modigliani and Miller’s theorem itself is
flawed because it disregards the effect of capital structure on debtor behavior, and (2) in the
context of secured lending, the theorem’s application depends upon several irrational
assumptions about secured loans. See David G. Carlson, On the Efficiency of Secured
Lending, 80 VA. L. REV. 2179 (1994) (arguing that the most ordinary price theory shows that
secured lending is rational). See also Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of
the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305,
332–33 (1976) (using proofs to determine the optimal level of investment by firm managers,
taking agency costs into consideration). Additionally, since the irrelevance theorem (like
many economic theorems) assumes a perfect capital market, other real-world factors also
affect the puzzle of secured credit. For example, lenders do not decide what rates to charge
given a debtor’s value in a vacuum. Rather, interest rates are heavily determined by regulatory
forces. Modigliani and Miller’s theorem has inspired extensive debate. The possibility that
some debtors will use security interests to shift down-side risk to unsecured creditors persists,
regardless of whether the prospect of exporting costs explains the prevalence of secured
lending generally.
70. See, e.g., Steven L. Schwarcz, Securitization Post-Enron, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 1539,
1553-69 (2004) (arguing that securitization is efficient). Cf. Steven L. Schwarcz, The Easy
Case for the Priority of Secured Claims in Bankruptcy, 47 DUKE L.J. 425, 429 (1997)
(discussing scholars who found that secured credit benefits the debtor but can increase the
risk to non-adjusting creditors, who are not compensated for taking on this additional risk).
71. See e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuck & Jesse M. Fried, The Uneasy Case for the Priority of
Secured Credit in Bankruptcy, 105 YALE L.J. 857 (1996) (analyzing full priority secured
credit to show that costs of full priority can result in inefficient contracting between borrowers
and lenders); Jacoby & Janger, supra note 8, at 48-52.
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lending rules apply to, and are exaggerated by, securitization transactions.72
Commercial law literature discusses extensively the critique that secured
lending—and securitization—persist because they enable debtors to transfer
costs to non-adjusting creditors.
Kaldor-Hicks efficiency and ABS statutes. If securitization is efficient
because it lowers costs of capital and produces other efficiencies in capital
markets, then the true-sale doctrine, it seems, facilitates efficiency to the
extent that it solidifies the bankruptcy-remote status of assets. This
observation would appear to be the impetus behind the ABS statues and other
legislative safe harbor provisions designed to create certainty and reduce or
eliminate re-characterization risk.73
But it is not necessarily true that if securitization is efficient and
therefore desirable, then an ABS statute is the best approach to true-sale
rules. ABS statutes are over-broad and may undermine efficiency, even if
we start from the premise that, in a Kaldor-Hicks sense, securitization
generally is efficient. This section sets aside the question of uncertainty of
the current ABS statutes’ effects in bankruptcy (which is discussed below),74
and focuses instead on two points. First, the relationship between law and
markets is dynamic. The current legal landscape contemplates recharacterization risk.75 Securitization may be efficient currently, but could
become inefficient in a different legal landscape. In the absence of recharacterization risk, market actors may structure deals in ways that
aggravate the possibility of negative externalities.76 Second, if an ABS
statute is desirable, the formulation enacted in Texas,77 as non-uniform UCC
section 9-109(e), is better than the broader formulation enacted in
72. See Heather Hughes, Creditors’ Imagined Communities and the Unfettered
Expansion of Secured Lending, 83 DENV. U. L. REV. 425, 436-39 (2005) (describing how
securitization amplifies scholars’ concerns about full-priority secured lending).
73. See infra Part II.B. There is no extensive legislative history illuminating lawmakers’
objectives in enacting ABS statutes. However, some state laws may be instructive: Texas Bar
commentary notes the need for certainty with respect to Texas usury law, and Delaware’s
ABS statute facilitates accounting treatment as sales in transactions where lawyers cannot
issue a true-sale opinion letter. See Plank, supra note 10, at 1733-34 (arguing that the statutes’
relevance extends beyond bankruptcy cases and may encourage courts to uphold sales in close
cases).
74. See infra Part II.B.1.
75. This is true even in jurisdictions that enact ABS statutes, given the possibilities of
preemption or other, equitable qualifications of property interests in bankruptcy. See infra text
accompanying notes 81-86.
76. Janger has made this point as well. See Janger, supra note 10, at 1775 (arguing that,
in the absence of substantive true-sale rules, parties may not be as concerned with how a judge
may characterize the transaction after the fact, resulting in a greater number of inefficient
transactions).
77. Louisiana enacted a provision similar to the Texas statute. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §
10:9-109(e) (West 2016); TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN § 9-109(e) (West 2015).
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Delaware,78 as the free-standing “Asset Backed Securities Facilitation Act,”
because of implications for decision-making in bankruptcy. These points are
discussed in turn below.
Markets are legally constructed in the sense that legally enforceable
contractual obligations and property rights link market actors to one another
and provide crucial infrastructure for market activity. The law-finance
dynamic is a complex subject.79 The relevance of this dynamic, here, is to
observe that securitization—to the extent it is efficient—would not
necessarily be more efficient if the law eliminated re-characterization risk in
any and all transactions in which the parties call their conveyance a “sale,”
regardless of economic substance. It is an unanswered empirical question,
and a shifting one over time, whether securitization is efficient despite costs
to third parties, or whether it is inefficient because it externalizes costs.80
Those who claim securitization is inefficient base their reasoning on the
effects securitization can have on unsecured creditors. Considering this,
true-sale rules that eliminate re-characterization risk regardless of economic
substance could aggravate the volume of instances in which securitization
externalizes costs, such that in the aggregate securitization no longer creates
wealth (through reduced costs of capital) in excess of such externalized costs.
In distinguishing “legitimate securitization transactions from judgment
proofing,”81 for example, Steven Schwarcz explains that in a securitization,
originators receive value in exchange for assets securitized. “[T]he goal of
judgment proofing,” he states, “is to impose externalities on a firm’s
creditors, preventing them from enforcing their claims against assets that
otherwise should be available for payment.”82 Securitization is distinct from
judgment proofing because the firm exchanges assets for cash, substituting

78. Other states have enacted free-standing ABS statutes similar to the Delaware statute.
See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 35-10A-2(a)(1) (West 2016); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, §§ 2701A-2703A
(West 2016); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1109.75 (West 2016); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 54-1-10
(West 2016); N.C. GEN. STATE. §§ 53-425, 53-426 (West 2015).
79. Scholars such as Katharina Pistor, for example, assess the relationship between law
and markets. See Katharina Pistor, A Legal Theory of Finance, 41 J. COMP. ECON. 315 (2013)
(stating a legal theory of finance (LTF) in which markets are legally constructed and occupy
a hybrid public-private space). Law and finance may be in tension when enforcement of
obligations threatens the financial system. Pistor describes a law-finance paradox in which
markets are legally constructed, but legal elasticity at the apex of the financial-legal system
demarcates power. Law tends to be binding at the periphery of the financial system and elastic
at its apex. Id. The securitization market and the true-sale doctrine would provide an apt
context in which to explore Pistor’s legal theory of finance. However, this Article does not
undertake that analysis.
80. Cf. White, supra note 68 (responding to LoPucki’s claim that corporations are using
securitization to evade creditor liability).
81. Steven L. Schwarcz, Ring-Fencing, 87 S. CAL. L. REV. 69, 83 n.94 (2013).
82. Id. at 83.
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one asset for another in a sale transaction rather than shifting assets offbalance sheet to prevent recovery by unsecured creditors.83 “Securitization,
much like a new-money loan, would not have a net adverse impact on nonadjusting creditors of a company to the extent it entails the exchange of one
type of asset (e.g., mortgage loans, automotive loans, or other financial
assets) for another asset, cash.”84 Non-adjusting creditors are only harmed,
he argues, to the extent the originator over-invests the cash or the risk of
insolvency increases.85
Schwarcz’s distinction between judgment proofing and legitimate
securitization, however, assumes true-sale rules that require a fair exchange
of assets for cash in receivables securitizations. In a jurisdiction that enacts
an ABS statute, or that does not rigorously analyze recourse and price
provisions to establish that receivables assignments have the economic
substance of sales, companies could securitize assets on terms that
externalize costs onto non-adjusting creditors.86
Again, this Article does not argue that securitization is efficient or
inefficient.
It illuminates the relationship between positions on
securitization’s efficiency and formulations of the true-sale doctrine.
If one nonetheless takes the position that the benefits of lower costs of
capital will always outweigh costs to third parties, then an ABS statute that
eliminates re-characterization risk would seem desirable. However, the form
of ABS statute enacted in Delaware and other states raises a different set of
efficiency questions concerning decisions about continuation versus
liquidation in bankruptcy.87 Unlike in Delaware, the ABS statute in Texas is
a non-uniform provision of UCC Article 9.88 Section 9-109(e), enacted in
Texas, better facilitates efficiency than the Delaware statute, because its
83. See Schwarcz, supra note 68, at 12-17 (explaining that an arm’s length transaction
does not necessarily result in judgment proofing). But cf. Lynn M. LoPucki, The Death of
Liability, 106 YALE L. J. 1, 6 (1996) (finding that “currently effective judgment-proofing
strategies are fully capable of defeating the liability system”).
84. Steven L. Schwarcz, The Conundrum of Covered Bonds, 66 BUS. L. 561, 584 (2011).
85. Id. at 583.
86. Similarly, in discussing the differences between securitization and covered bond
transactions, Schwarcz assumes a substantive true-sale doctrine. Two crucial differences
between covered bonds and securitizations are that (i) covered bonds have full recourse to the
issuer, whereas securitization financing is non-recourse; and (ii) covered bonds involve a
dynamic asset pool that remains on the issuer’s balance sheet, whereas securitization
effectively fixes a segregated asset pool. See Schwarcz, The Conundrum of Covered Bonds,
supra note 84, at 571, 586. These differences assume that the assignment of receivables and
accompanying servicing arrangement for securitization do not contain provisions creating a
level of recourse that is inconsistent with substantive segregation and sale treatment. An ABS
statute enacts true-sale rules that would recognize a legal sale despite recourse level. An
incoherent, poorly administered common-law approach could do so as well.
87. See infra text accompanying notes 198-99.
88. See infra note 197.
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scope is limited to assets contemplated in UCC 9-109(a)(3)—receivables and
the like.89 As such, Texas’s ABS statutory provisions eliminate recharacterization risk90 only in securitizations of “replaceable” or “nonessential” assets.91 As discussed below, Ayotte and Gaon find that
bankruptcy remoteness of replaceable assets facilitates efficient disposition
of assets in bankruptcy. This is because the assets are not available for
assignment in a debtor-in-possession financing, forcing financers to rely on
the value of the firm’s projects; at the same time, the holders of replaceable,
securitized assets do not have undue hold-out power over the firm, as they
do in cases of securitization of essential assets.92
Inefficiencies and the relevance of price. Though many commentators
argue that securitization is efficient, numerous others contest this position.
Dissenters argue that securitization is inefficient because it involves
extraction of a subsidy from unsecured creditors, artificially depressing
interest rates by externalizing costs.93 Scholars expressed this position
succinctly in a letter to Congress opposing proposed bankruptcy law section
912, which would have functioned much like the state ABS statutes,
eliminating re-characterization risk for ABS investors. Their letter states:
[Credit groups claim that] financing costs will be reduced [if
lawmakers eliminate re-characterization risk] because of greater
‘predictability.’ Unfortunately, it is not possible to lower total
costs when total risks remain the same. Instead, §912 simply gives
one group of lenders a much better position than all others, driving
up the costs for all other parties. . . . Favored institutions may
charge less to make loans if they know they will be given a
substantial advantage over all the other creditors. Yet there is no
reason that these securitized creditors should be given special
preference over banks, bondholders, suppliers, tort victims,
pension funds and employees who will be forced to bear the
increased risks, whether they can afford it or not.94

89. Id.
90. Again, this section forgoes discussion of uncertainty surrounding the effects of ABS
statutes in bankruptcy. For such discussion, see infra text accompanying notes 204-12.
91. See infra text accompanying notes 198-99.
92. See Ayotte & Gaon, supra note 7 (finding that bankruptcy remoteness helps prevent
inefficiencies when replaceable assets are securitized); infra text accompanying notes 235236 (noting that a “securitization” of essential assets would be a deal that is distinct in
important ways from a securitization of receivables). This Article follows Ayotte and Gaon’s
terminology for purposes of this part of the Article’s analysis.
93. See supra note 69.
94. Letter from Allan Axelrod, Professor Emeritus, Rutgers School of Law – Newark,
et al., to Sen. Patrick Leahy and Rep. F. James Sensenbrenner, AM. BANKR. INST. (Jan. 23,
2002), http://www.abi.org/abi-journal/legislative-update-proposed-rules-amendmentspublished-for-public-comment [https://perma.cc/KCH2-QAQ6].
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To the extent that securitization externalizes costs to other creditors, the
true-sale doctrine can potentially aggravate—or mitigate—this effect. Some
critics contend that efficiency and fairness concerns surrounding
securitization are inherent in the structure of these deals. From this vantage
point, the true sale doctrine may not significantly affect securitization’s
consequences. Others, however, point out that securitization may be
problematic in some situations but not others—deal terms can make a
securitization more or less efficient, or more or less fair.
To the extent deal terms can affect the efficiency and fairness of a
receivables securitization, purchase price, it would seem, is a deal term of
significant consequence. The true-sale doctrine could aggravate negative
effects on third parties in contexts where it finds assets to be bankruptcy
remote despite an inadequate purchase price.95 The doctrine could mitigate
such effects, conversely, to the extent that it assures a fair and financially
sound relationship between the value of the assets sold and the proceeds of
the financing.96 For commentators who are concerned that securitization
extracts a subsidy from non-adjusting creditors, fortifying a true-sale
doctrine that assures adequate compensation to the originator could
minimize this subsidy.
Again, whether adequate purchase price (enforced with true-sale rules)
would actually mitigate efficiency concerns depends on one’s opinion of
securitization. Some argue that the structure of securitization and firstpriority secured lending depend upon extraction of a subsidy from nonadjusting creditors.97 From this perspective, securitization will artificially
depress interest rates (externalizing costs), making it unfair to non-adjusting
creditors, regardless of the adequacy of the purchase price an originator
received for securitized assets. (Also, even assignments that involve a fair
purchase price for securitized assets exchange valuable assets for cash that
the originator may then use in ways that do not add value to the firm or are
disadvantageous to unsecured creditors.98) Others, however, would consider
whether assuring a fair price for assets securitized could enlist the true-sale
doctrine in minimizing concerns about externalizing costs onto nonadjusting creditors.
For example, as noted above, Schwarcz’s distinction between judgment
proofing and legitimate securitization turns on a fair exchange of assets for
95. Note that technically, the purchase price should never be “inadequate,” because the
seller both receives proceeds of the financing and holds the equity of the SPE. The adequacy
of compensation question turns on valuation of the equity, not just the amount of the proceeds
versus the valuation of the assigned assets.
96. For discussion of the complexity of determining adequate price in this context, see
infra text accompanying notes 183-87.
97. See e.g., LoPucki, The Death of Liability, supra note 68.
98. See Schwarcz, supra note 84, at 583 (discussing harms of over-investment).
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cash.99 Schwarcz, in discussing externalities of transactions, uses the term
“responsibility failure” to describe a firm’s ability to externalize costs of
taking an action.100 “Focusing on responsibility failure,” he writes, helps to
“shift attention back to the fundamental cause of the externalities: in this
case, the government’s failure to impose laws that limit the ability of firms
to externalize those costs.”101 Following this line of thinking, we could
conceive of true-sale rules that exclude non-adjusting creditors from assets
despite inadequate purchase price as a responsibility failure on the state’s
part.
Scholars such as Robert D. Aicher and William J. Fellerhoff have
argued that true-sale determinations should turn on whether the buyer has
paid a fair market value for the package of rights and recourse received.102
The main challenge to effectuating this approach lies in the complexity of
determining an adequate price, given the number of factors that valuation of
a receivables conveyance involves. Such a conveyance may include various
kinds of recourse provisions, servicing obligations, and complex
discounting, as well as disparate information available to buyer and seller,
disparate bargaining positions, and changing market trends103—all of which
make it difficult for courts to determine the adequacy of a price.104
The role of price in factors-based approaches to the true-sale doctrine is
more thoroughly discussed in Part II.A.2. The point, here, is to observe that
to the extent commentators or policymakers believe that securitization is
inefficient because it externalizes costs to non-adjusting creditors, true-sale
rules that are designed to minimize such “subsidy” by promoting fair pricing
could mitigate inefficiencies.105
To date, literature on the efficiency of securitization exists largely apart
from literature analyzing the true-sale doctrine. Making explicit the
implications of varying views on securitization’s efficiency for formulations
of true-sale rules enables a more informed, policy-based approach to these
rules.
2. Ayotte and Gaon on the value of bankruptcy remoteness
The consequences of re-characterization may seem minor, given that
99. See supra text accompanying notes 66, 68-69.
100. See Schwarcz, Ring-Fencing, supra note 81, at 84, 93-94 (discussing the role
externalities play in market failure).
101. Id. at 93.
102. See Aicher & Fellerhoff, infra note 168 (discussing ways to analyze securitizations
and true sales in bankruptcy cases).
103. Id.
104. See infra Part II.A.2.
105. Part IV.A sketches a proposal for a partial codification of this approach.
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investors in securitized assets still have a first-priority lien, pursuant to UCC
Article 9. But the difference between having investors that hold a firstpriority security interest in bankruptcy, versus an interest in assets that are
bankruptcy remote, affects whether an originator can obtain new financing
or must liquidate. Ayotte and Gaon analyze the value of bankruptcy
remoteness, given sources of possible inefficiency in bankruptcy rooted in
decisions about continuation, versus liquidation, of the bankrupt firm.106
Ayotte and Gaon find bankruptcy remoteness (of securitized assets) to
be the feature that distinguishes ABS from secured debt.107 They then assert
the value of bankruptcy remoteness in two ways. First, they explain that
because securitized assets are not part of an originator’s bankruptcy estate,
they leave the originator with fewer assets that are assignable to raise debtorin-possession (DIP) financing, which “reduces the incentives of the DIP
lender to provide new funds, which can mitigate the excess continuation
problem inherent in the bankruptcy law.”108 Second, they compare ABS
spreads over maturity-matched swap rates in the six-month period leading
up to, and following, In re LTV Steel Company, Inc.109—a case in which a
bankruptcy judge allowed an originator (LTV Steel) to use securitized assets
as cash collateral during its Chapter 11 reorganization process.110 Their
comparison finds that ABS spreads for Chapter 11-eligible originators
increased significantly, as compared to spreads for originators that were not
Chapter 11-eligible (and therefore subject to true-sale rules contained in
FDIC regulation, rather than those applied in Chapter 11 proceedings, for
which In re LTV Steel is relevant).111 To the extent that Ayotte and Gaon’s
findings are accurate, they attest to the importance of legal true sales.
Ayotte and Gaon discuss efficiencies surrounding continuation and
liquidation in bankruptcies of Chapter-11 eligible securitizers. They explain
that the “key economic difference between ‘continuation’ and ‘liquidation’
is that the former (a) requires new financing, and (b) involves a delayed
resolution, which may reduce the value of assets-in-place. These conditions
give rise to a conflict of interest between the manager/DIP lender coalition

106. See Ayotte & Gaon, supra note 7 (concluding that bankruptcy remoteness is
worthwhile to investors).
107. Id. at 1300. Other commentators focus on benefits of pooling assets together and
selling them to investors in tranches, or on securitization’s capacity to enable economizing on
regulatory capital requirements. Id.
108. Ayotte & Gaon, supra note 7, at 1302.
109. In re LTV Steel Co., 274 B.R. 278 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2001). See also infra text
accompanying notes 159-64 (discussing LTV Steel Co.).
110. See Ayotte & Gaon, supra note 7, at 1303 (discussing LTV Steel Co.)
111. See id. (noting that “spreads on ABS issued by non-depository institutions increased
by approximately 25 basis points more than the control group in the period following LTV.”)
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and the initial investors in bankruptcy.”112 The capacity of the bankrupt
entity to obtain continuation funding will be determined by the quality of its
projects and its existing capital structure. Managers, Ayotte and Gaon state,
are biased towards continuation.113 This bias, along with the fact that existing
claims are costly to renegotiate, leads to two possible sources of
inefficiency.114
First, a firm that has negative-value projects may continue inefficiently
if it can obtain continuation financing.115 DIP financing is entirely senior to
unsecured creditors, and can partially dilute interests of secured creditors—
a fact that several scholars have shown can lead to overinvestment and excess
continuation.116 A firm’s capacity to obtain continuation financing depends
on whether assets are included in the bankruptcy estate, and therefore
available for assignment to a continuation lender (potentially diluting
existing secured creditors). Hence, to the extent that securitization involves
a true sale of assets to a bankruptcy remote SPE, it lessens the capacity of
the DIP to dilute pre-bankruptcy lenders, leaving continuation financers to
look more fully at the value of the firm’s ongoing projects.117
Second, a firm may liquidate inefficiently if it has positive-value
projects but cannot obtain continuation financing.118 Whether securitization
aggravates or mitigates inefficiency depends upon the type of assets
securitized. If the firm has securitized necessary assets, such as equipment,
inventory, or intellectual property, then the hold-up power of ABS investors
may impede efficient continuation financing.
Ayotte and Gaon find that securitization is most valuable when the
assets involved are replaceable assets, such as receivables. “In such
circumstances,” they state, “ABS provides maximal protection to creditors
and subjects the bankrupt firm to a more stringent market test in order to
receive new funds.”119 Secured debt, in contrast, can be preferable to ABS
when the assets involved are necessary assets, because the investors have
less hold-up power when they are secured creditors rather than ABS
investors.120
112. Id. at 1301 n.3.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. See Ayotte & Gaon, supra note 7, at 1302 (citing G. G. Triantis, A Theory of the
Regulation of Debtor-in-Possession Financing, 46 VANDERBILT L. REV. 901-34 (1993); R.
Gertner & D. Scharfstein, A Theory of Workouts and the Effects of Reorganization Law, 46 J.
OF FIN. 1189-222 (1991); M. J. White, The Corporate Bankruptcy Decision, 3 J. OF ECON.
PERSP. 129-51 (1989)).
117. Ayotte & Gaon, supra note 7, at 1301-02.
118. Id. at 1301.
119. Ayotte & Gaon, supra note 7, at 1302.
120. Id.
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Ayotte and Gaon measure the value of bankruptcy remoteness by
comparing credit spreads in the ABS market before and after In re LTV Steel
(and the increased risk of re-characterization that it presented). They find
that “increased risk of [re-characterization] results in lower overall efficiency
and higher interest rates for ABS investors in equilibrium.”121 This Article
does not vet Ayotte and Gaon’s empirical results. Rather, their results are
offered here as findings that—to the extent true—attest to the value of
bankruptcy remoteness and therefore importance of the true-sale doctrine.
For purposes of the true-sale doctrine, it is of utmost interest that Ayotte
and Gaon find that bankruptcy remoteness has measurable value as
compared to secured debt, when the assets securitized are receivables. If
bankruptcy remoteness in receivables securitization promotes efficient
outcomes in bankruptcy, and re-characterization risk imposes costs, then a
clear and well-administered true-sale doctrine would contribute to efficient
outcomes. Re-characterization risk can arise from either (i) substantive truesale rules that favor finding security interests when transactions are hybrid
or complex, or (ii) uncertainty and lack of clarity surrounding the true-sale
doctrine. As such, the ABS statutes may, under Ayotte and Gaon’s model,
facilitate efficient outcomes in bankruptcy to the extent they apply to
securitizations of replaceable assets.
C. Legal rules and accounting standards
The accounting profession has a different orientation than the legal
profession. Accountants seek to have the books of a firm accurately reflect
the firm’s practical economic position—not necessarily the firm’s legal
position.122 Yet a firm’s practical economic position and its legal position
are inter-related. In the context of true sales of receivables, accounting
standards consider legal isolation of assets.
A true-sale legal opinion letter from counsel to an originator that is
securitizing assets, in favor of investors, accompanies asset-backed
securities.123 The Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB)124
121. Id. at 1303, 1322-26.
122. See Aicher & Fellerhoff, infra note 168, at 204 (noting the distinct differences in
accountants’ versus banking regulators’ practices).
123. See infra text accompanying note 127.
124. FASB operates under the Financial Accounting Foundation, a private, non-profit
organization. Established in 1973, FASB replaced AICPA’s Accounting Principles Board as
the official source of accounting standards for non-governmental entities. These standards are
referred to as GAAP—generally accepted accounting principles; they are published in
FASB’s “Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. xxx.” Since July 2009, FASB has
issued Accounting Standards Codification (ASC), to make standards more accessible. The
ASC, and Securities Exchange Commission guidance, represent the only authoritative sources
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articulates—in FAS 140 and amendments—accounting rules for determining
when securitized assets belong off of an originator’s balance sheet.125 The
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA)126 considers the
true-sale legal opinion to be evidential in determining correct accounting
treatment for a receivables financing.127
of U.S. GAAP. About the FASB, FIN. ACCOUNTING FOUNDATION BD. (FASB),
http://www.fasb.org/cs/ContentServer?c=Page&pagename=FASB%2FPage%2FSectionPag
e&cid=1176154526495 [https://perma.cc/4CK5-96T2] (last visited June 18, 2016). See also,
Policy Statement: Reaffirming the Status of the FASB as a Designated Private-Sector
Standard Setter, SEC. EXCH. COMM’N (Apr. 25, 2003), https://www.sec.gov/rules/policy/338221.htm [https://perma.cc/C5FD-7RYJ] (designating FASB’s financial accounting and
reporting standards as “generally accepted”); Digital Timeline: 40 Years of FASB, FASB,
http://www.fasb.org/jsp/FASB/Page/TimelinePage&cid=1175805309640
[https://perma.cc/K3FD-AG3G] (lasted visited June 18, 2016) (“In 2002, FASB and AICPA
agreed that AICPA’s Accounting Standards Executive Committee will no longer issue
guidance that is considered authoritative US GAAP”).
125. See FASB, Accounting Standards Codification, Topic 860, Transfers and Servicing
(2009) (replacing FASB, Statement of FAS No. 166, which replaced FAS 140); Summary of
Statement of No. 140: Accounting for Transfers and Servicing of Financial Assets and
Extinguishments of Liabilities – A Replacement of FASB Statement No. 125, FASB (Sept.
2000), http://www.fasb.org/summary/stsum140.shtml [https://perma.cc/N896-ADWP] (last
visited June 24, 2016); G. Wogan Bernard, Update on the Amendments to FAS 140 –
Accounting for Transfers of Financial Assets and Repurchase Financing Transactions (June
2009), https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/rpte_ereport/2009/june
/rp_g_wogan_bernard. authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/L7XY-Q293]; Project Update:
Transfer of Financial Assets, FASB (June 22, 2009), http://www.fasb.org/project
/transfers_of_financial_assets.shtml#due_process [https://perma.cc/95FH-C9DG]; Revised
Exposure Draft for Proposed Amended to FAS-140, FASB (No. 1610-100),
http://www.fasb.org/draft/ed_transfers_financial_assets_amend_st140.pdf [https://perma.cc
/6XNS-65YX]; General Summary of Comment Letters to the Proposed Amendments to FAS140, FASB, http://www.fasb.org/project/cl_summary_transfers_of_financial_assets.pdf
[https://perma.cc/BM44-FLN7] (last visited June 24, 2016).
126. The AICPA is the largest U.S. professional organization of CPAs. It establishes the
professional code of ethics for accountants. AICPA supports FASB’s standard-setting efforts
with its publications: the Financial Reporting Executive Committee (FinREC) issues
Comment Letters, which discuss financial reporting policies and AICPA’s positions on
various proposals presented by FASB. About the AICPA, AM. INST. OF CERTIFIED PUB.
ACCOUNTS (AICPA), http://www.aicpa.org/About/Pages/About.aspx [https://perma. cc/RJ
6D-GJXU] (last visited June 22, 2016). Financial Reporting Advocacy, AICPA, https://
www.aicpa. org/Advocacy/FinancialReporting/Pages/FRAdvocacy.aspx [https://perma.cc/2
HV7-33JH] (last visited June 22, 2016). See also Accounting and Financial Reporting –
Positions and Comment Letters, AICPA, https://www.aicpa.org/Advocacy/FinancialReporti
ng/Pages/FinRECPositions.aspx [https://perma.cc/7WTP-366B] (last visited June 22, 2016).
127. See Am. Inst. of Certified Pub. Accountants [hereinafter AICPA], AU-C §9620,
Interpretation No.1: The Use of Legal Interpretations as Audit Evidence to Support
Management’s Assertion That a Transfer of Financial Assets Has Met the Isolation Criterion
in Paragraphs 7–14 of Financial Accounting Standards Board Accounting Standards
Codification 860-10-40 (2015), https://www.aicpa.org/Research/Standards/AuditAttest/
DownloadableDocuments/AU-C-00620_9.pdf [https://perma.cc/MLE9-5EXU]; FAS 166
, §4(h) (June 2009) (suggesting a legal opinion letter of broader scope than before, covering
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Accounting is central to financial reporting, and as such, the Securities
and Exchange Commission affects accounting criteria for moving assets offbalance sheet. FAS 166 and 167 (amending FAS 140) seek to limit “sale”
accounting treatment to instances in which the seller truly surrenders control
of the assets.128 In any given receivables securitization, there may be a true
sale for legal purposes, but not accounting purposes.129 In some instances,
accounting treatment may be a motivation for securitization itself.130
Legal isolation of securitized assets, for accounting purposes,131 is often
established with true-sale opinion letters from attorneys—letters that are
complicated by the convoluted nature of the true-sale doctrine and the
uncertainties of bankruptcy. In this sense, accounting practices are affected
by the state of the true-sale doctrine. True-sale opinion letters serve a variety
of functions in the context of receivables securitization. They are issued by
counsel to the originator, for the benefit of investors, to assure investors that
the assets backing the securities they purchase have been conveyed to the
SPE in a true sale, such that they are not reachable by creditors of the
originator in bankruptcy.132 Though these letters are issued to investors,
all aspects of legal isolation instead of just the “true sale” component). The AICPA and the
ABA Committee on Legal Opinions have collaborated in the process of delineating guidelines
for reliance on legal opinions in connection with “legal isolation”; following the financial
crisis the AICPA as revisited its requirements for legal opinions on true-sale treatment. See
Steven O. Weise, AICPA Proposes Expansion of Form of True Sale Opinion, ABA BUS. LAW
SEC., 12 IN OUR OPINION: THE NEWSLETTER OF THE COMMITTEE ON LEGAL OPINIONS, 13–17
(2012),
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/business_law/newsletters/CL5
10000/full-issue-201212.authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/5HQV-4BBG] (evaluating the
form opinion proposed by the AICPA that would expand the scope of its standard true-sale
opinion).
128. Reza Dibadj, Four Key Elements to Successful Financial Regulatory Reform, 6
HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 377, 381 n.17 (2010).
129. See Schwarcz, What is Securitization? at 1286 n.18 (noting that a sale may transpire
for accounting purposes but not for other purposes, such as bankruptcy).
130. See Patricia M. Dechow, Linda A. Myers & Catherine Shakespeare, Fair Value
Accounting and Gains from Asset Securitizations: A Convenient Earnings Management Tool
with Compensation Side-Benefits, 49 J. ACCT. & ECON. 2 (2010). Accounting treatment may
provide motivation to securitize assets, but current accounting rules are meant to discourage
manipulation. See FAS 140, 166, 167, supra note 125; Lipson, supra note 50, at nn. 10, 130.
131. Fin. Accounting Standards Bd., Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No.
140, at 70-72, available at http://fasb.org/pdf/fas140.pdf [https://perma.cc/G455-HGDN].
132. See Kenneth C. Kettering, Securitization and its Discontents, 29 CARDOZO L. REV.
1553, 1681-87 (2008) (discussing rating agencies’ role in the securitization market); Thomas
E. Plank, Sense and Sensibility in Securitization: A Prudent Legal Structure and a Fanciful
Critique, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 617, 632-40 (2008) (rebutting Kettering’s article by arguing
that securitization as a financial product is not “too big to fail”); Steven L. Schwarcz, The
Limits of Lawyering: Legal Opinions in Structured Finance, 84 TEX. L. REV. 1, 5-6 (2005)
(remarking that true sale and nonconslidation opinions are issued by most major law firms)
Tribar Opinion Comm., Special Report by the Tribar Opinion Committee: Opinions in the

HUGHES_FINAL_EIC ADJ_JUSTIFIED FOONOTE (DO NOT DELETE)

896

U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW

12/6/2017 10:00 AM

[Vol. 19.4

rating agencies, and originators, the letters typically allow originators to
provide copies to accountants to support an originator’s assertion that the
transfer meets the legal isolation requirements for sale accounting
treatment.133
True-sale opinions are typically reasoned opinions.134 They include a
host of exceptions, and an analysis of current law, based on which the issuing
law firm opines that transferred assets would not be included in the assets of
the originator (seller) if the originator becomes a debtor in bankruptcy or the
FDIC appoints a receiver.135 Critics of rating agents’ practices in the wake
of the financial crisis observe that rating agents (and other third parties
relying on legal opinion letters) often focus simply on the opinion’s
conclusion, without fully considering or understanding the substance and
implications of the various qualifications the opinion contains.136
The accounting profession and the legal profession have worked
together to devise a form of true-sale opinion that can support the “legal
isolation” requirement for accounting purposes.137 The AICPA proposed in
Bankruptcy Context: Rating Agency, Structured Financing, and Chapter 11 Transactions, 46
BUS. LAW. 717 (1991) (discussing generally legal opinions concerning bankruptcy law issues
offered in the context of financial and commercial transactions).
133. Along with a true-sale legal opinion, investors typically require an enforceability
opinion (attesting to the legal enforceability of the deal documents), and a non-consolidation
opinion (attesting to the legal separateness of the SPE, as an entity, such that it would not be
consolidated with the originator in bankruptcy).
134. For a general discussion of opinions practice, and reasoned opinions, versus
unqualified opinions, see DONALD W. GLAZER ET AL., GLAZER & FITZGIBBON ON LEGAL
OPINIONS (2d ed. 2001 & Cum. Supp.); LEGAL OPINION LETTERS FORMBOOK (A. Sidney
Holderness, Jr. & Brooke Wunnicke eds., 3d ed. 2010); Thomas L. Ambro & Arthur Norman
Field, The Legal Opinion Risk Seminar Papers, 62 BUS. L. 397 (2007).
135. See Lois R. Lupica, Revised Article 9, The Proposed Bankruptcy Code Amendments
and Securitizing Debtors and Their Creditors, 7 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 321, 331 (2002)
(discussing the difficulty of definitively concluding that a particular asset transfer is a true
sale, and resulting unwillingness among law firms to issue unqualified legal opinions to that
effect). See also Kenneth C. Kettering, Securitization and Its Discontents: The
Dynamics of Financial Product Development, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 1553, 1684 (2008) (noting
that opinion letters in securitization opinions can contain so many caveats that they are
virtually ineffectual); Jeffrey Manns, Rating Risk After the Subprime Mortgage Crisis: A User
Fee Approach for Rating Agency Accountability, 87 N.C. L. REV. 1011, 1070 n.242, 1080
(2009) (referring to transactional lawyers’ opinion letters as attorney work product loaded
with ad nauseum caveats). Attorneys distinguish qualified opinions from “non-opinions”opinions that are so extensively qualified that they do not actually give the opinion they
purport to render. ABA Guidelines advise against issuing “non-opinion” letters in favor of
more explicitly expressing to the client and third party that the attorney cannot give the
requested opinion. See, e.g., THOMAS L. AMBRO ET AL., CERTAIN GUIDELINES FOR THE
NEGOTIATION AND PREPARATION OF THIRD-PARTY LEGAL OPINIONS II.C. (4) (1991)
(accompanying the 1991 Third-Party Legal Opinion Report and Accord).
136. See e.g., Kettering, supra note 135, at 1681-87.
137. See Steven O. Weise, AICPA Proposes Expansion of Form of True Sale Opinion, in
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2012 a suggested legal opinion letter that is much broader in scope than
earlier forms, in that it covers all aspects of legal isolation (rather than just
the “sale” question).138 The Business Law Section of the American Bar
Association formed a group to address the AICPA’s proposal.139 The 2015
adoption of the AU-C sec. 9620 appears to have ended discussion of broader
opinion coverage.140 The AU-C sec. 9620 addresses an “auditor’s
responsibilities relating to the work of an individual or organization
possessing expertise in a field other than accounting or auditing when that
work is used to assist the auditor in obtaining sufficient appropriate audit
evidence.”141
Accounting and legal standards for true sales are most explicitly
intertwined in the context of the FDIC rules.142 These rules create a safe
harbor from re-characterization risk for investors buying ABS from FDICregulated issuers.143 They require that assignments of securitized assets meet
accounting standards for sale treatment, other than the “legal isolation”
element.144 The FDIC securitization rule was originally adopted in 2000, in
reference to FAS 140.145 The rule both contemplated technical requirements
of FAS 140, and assured investors that securitized assets would not be
reclaimed by the FDIC in receivership or conservatorship of an FDICregulated originator.
The evolution of both FAS 140 and the FDIC rules after the 2008
financial crisis, however, is complex. In 2009, the FASB adopted FAS 166
and FAS 167, amending FAS 140.146 These amendments substantially
ABA BUS. LAW SEC., 12 IN OUR OPINION: THE NEWSLETTER OF THE COMMITTEE ON LEGAL
OPINIONS, 13–17 (2012), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/
business_law/newsletters/CL510000/full-issue-201212.authcheckdam.pdf
[https://perma.cc/J3CR-42DW] (noting that the accountants may obtain support through a
legal opinion for their proposition that an asset has been “legally isolated” from the
transferor).
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. See comments from T. Plank.
141. See “Using the Work of an Auditor’s Specialist: Auditing Interpretations of Section
620,” available at
https://www.aicpa.org/research/standards/auditattest/pages/clarifiedsas.aspx
[https://perma.cc/Q7JM-TQV4].
142. See infra Part II.B.2 (discussing the FDIC rules surrounding the true-sale doctrine).
143. See infra Part II.B.2 (detailing the safe harbors created by the FDIC rules); 12 CFR
360.6.
144. 12 CFR 360.6(b); see infra text accompanying note 215.
145. See Morrison & Foerster, “FDIC Issues Final Safe Harbor Rule,” News Bulletin,
Oct. 5, 2010, available at https://media2.mofo.com/documents/101005-fdic-issues-final-safeharbor-rule.pdf [https://perma.cc/9YKF-VCGZ] (discussing the history of the FASB
securitization rule).
146. Id.
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narrow the instances in which an assignment of financial assets in a
securitization transaction may be accounted for as a sale.147 After 2009,
many deals that previously would have been accounting sales are treated as
secured loans for accounting purposes.148 Lawmakers, then, revisited the
FDIC securitization rule, taking the position that the safe harbor should apply
differently depending on whether a transfer is a secured loan or a sale under
the new accounting standards.149 The revised FDIC rules also require that
securitizations meet other, reform-oriented qualitative standards.150
II.

THE TRUE-SALE DOCTRINE: PROBLEMATIC, EXISTING
APPROACHES

This part describes existing approaches to the true-sale doctrine. It
discusses the limitations of these approaches, highlighting the importance of
bringing a more thorough and theoretically grounded analysis to this area of
law. Sections A and B summarize common-law and statutory true-sale rules,
respectively. Section C presents and critiques an approach recently proposed
by two prominent commercial law scholars. Considering how much is at
stake surrounding accurate administration of the true-sale doctrine, the
confusion and lack of uniformity it entails are surprising (and disturbing).
Before delving into descriptions of current approaches to true-sale rules,
however, two points of context warrant mentioning: (i) the relationship
between true-sale rules and UCC Article 9, and (ii) the case of In re LTV
Steel Company, Inc. UCC Article 9 provides a uniform body of law
governing receivables conveyances generally. However, the Uniform
Commercial Code does not contain provisions stating when an assignment
of receivables constitutes a sale, rather than an interest securing an
obligation. The code leaves to case law or other statutes the question of how
to characterize transactions.151
UCC Article 9 states the steps that parties must take to create an
enforceable receivables assignment, including that they follow Article 9’s
notice requirements.152 A purchaser of receivables must perfect its interest
pursuant to UCC Article 9, regardless of whether it is acquiring an ownership

147. See Schwarcz, supra note 84, at 572; Sidley Austin LLP, FDIC Adopts Final
Securitization Safe Harbor Rule, Oct. 4, 2010, available at
http://www.sidley.com/news/structured_finance_and_securitization_100410
[https://perma.cc/K77L-B74P].
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. See infra text accompanying notes 213-18.
151. See U.C.C. § 9-109 cmt. 4
152. U.C.C. § 9-203(b). This is the effect of U.C.C. § 9-109(a)(3).
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interest or a SISO.153 Article 9 governs conflicting claims to securitized
receivables.154 In addition, it makes contractual restrictions on assignment
ineffective to prevent enforceable assignments of receivables.155
The intent of the parties, as established pursuant to laws apart from the
UCC, determines the status of a transaction as a sale or loan.156 The difficulty
comes in determining the parties’ intentions. Generally speaking, the law
infers intent from the economic substance of a transaction—not from the
transaction’s form, meaning the language the parties use in describing their
respective interests.157 Otherwise, parties could engage in regulatory
arbitrage just by calling their transaction by the form that gives the investor
the most advantageous legal position despite the rights and obligations of the
parties, and any third parties affected by the deal.
Given the complexity of receivables securitizations, it may be difficult
to determine, before conducting a deal-specific analysis, whether a given
transaction in fact involves a true sale. UCC Article 9 contributes to opacity
surrounding the legal nature of assignments of receivables to off-balancesheet entities for purposes of securitization, by making sales and SISOs
indistinguishable in public records.158
Judge Bodoh, in the (in)famous bankruptcy proceedings in In re LTV
Steel Company, Inc.,159 stated that LTV Steel Company’s creditors retained
a property interest in securitized assets pending determination of the truesale nature of LTV Steel Company’s assignment of assets to its off-balancesheet subsidiaries, LTV Steel Products and LTV Sales Finance.160 In the
course of the bankruptcy proceedings, Judge Bodoh denied an emergency
motion by investors to modify an interim order permitting the creditors of
LTV Steel Company to draw on assets that had been assigned to LTV Sales
Finance pending resolution of the case. Judge Bodoh stated: “there seems to
be an element of sophistry to suggest that [LTV] does not retain at least an
equitable interest in the property that is subject to the interim order.”161
Describing the basis for this property interest, he writes: “[t]o suggest that
[LTV] lacks some ownership interest in products that it creates with its own
153. U.C.C. § 9-203(b). This is the effect of U.C.C. § 9-109(a)(3), including sales of
receivables in the scope of Article 9.
154. U.C.C. § 9-317(a), § 9-322(a).
155. U.C.C. § 9-408.
156. See JAMES J. WHITE AND G. ERIC BRUNSTAD, JR., SECURED TRANSACTIONS TEACHING
MATERIALS, Fourth Edition (2013) at 365-70.
157. Id.
158. See U.C.C. § 9-109(a)(3) (extending the scope of Article 9 to sales of receivables)
and § 9-505 (confirming that use of terminology designating parties as “seller” and “buyer”
in a UCC-1 financing statement does not affect substantive transaction classification).
159. 274 B.R. 278 (2001).
160. Id.
161. Id. at 285.
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labor, as well as the proceeds to be derived from that labor, is difficult to
accept.”162 Judge Bodoh’s concern was for the approximately 17,000
workers and 100,000 retirees that LTV Steel Company could potentially
continue to support, at least through the bankruptcy proceedings, if it could
access cash flows from receivables it assigned to LTV Sales Finance,
generated by sales of inventory it assigned to LTV Steel Products.
This concern from the bench sent shock waves through the
securitization industry, causing market actors and lawmakers to fret over the
legal underpinnings of securitization.163 LTV Steel Company withdrew its
challenge and settled with the investor that claimed that LTV Steel Company
retained no interest in the securitized assets to which a bankruptcy trustee’s
lien could attach.164 The legislature in Ohio, where LTV was located, passed
an ABS statute in order to try to override the true-sale doctrine and the
complex questions that it presents.165 In addition, Congress contemplated a
safe-harbor provision, proposed section 912 of the bankruptcy code,166 which
failed surrounding concerns about securitization practices following the
demise of Enron.167
A. Factors-based approaches
Case law addressing the true-sale doctrine is confusing, inconsistent,
and sometimes incoherent.168 Courts refer to multiple factors in assessing
162. Id.
163. See White & Brunstad, supra note 156, at 372. Commentators disagree, however, on
whether the shock waves and concerns about legal uncertainty were warranted. For example,
Thomas Plank has observed that but for the unique structure of LTV’s inventory financing,
its receivables financing would not have been questioned in court, and that the case does not
threaten the legal foundations of securitization. See Plank, supra note 2, at 191-92.
164. Note that this investor, Abbey National, funded LTV Steel Company’s operations
with the securitization transaction at issue to rescue it from a prior bankruptcy. See In re LTV
Steel Co., Inc., supra note 159, at 280-82.
165. It is unclear whether the ABS statutes succeed in replacing the true-sale doctrine.
Bankruptcy courts might refuse to recognize a form of interest that runs afoul of well-worn
characterization doctrines establishing the scope of ownership of securitized assets. See infra
text accompanying notes 204-12.
166. See infra Part IV.B.
167. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002); In re Enron
Corp. Sec., Derivative & ERISA Litigation, 235 F. Supp. 2d 549, 610 (S.D. Tex. 2002);
Jonathan C. Lipson, Enron, Asset Securitization and Bankruptcy Reform: Dead or Dormant?,
11 J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 101(2002) (commenting on the significant problems with proposed
section 912 especially as applied to Enron-type transactions); Steven L. Schwarcz, Enron and
the Use and Abuse of Special Purpose Entities in Corporate Structures, 70 U. CIN. L. REV.
1309, 1314-18 (2002) (describing concerns post-Enron, as well as risk of “overreaction” and
“consequent over-regulation.”).
168. Harris & Mooney, supra note 31, at 1040. See also Robert D. Aicher & William J.
Fellerhoff, Characterization of a Transfer of Receivables as a Sale or a Secured Loan Upon
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whether a given assignment of receivables is a true sale.169 These factors
include: (i) recourse to the seller, (ii) seller retention of servicing and
commingling of proceeds, (iii) failure to investigate the credit of account
debtors, (iv) seller rights to excess collections, (v) seller repurchase options,
(vi) rights to unilaterally adjust pricing terms, (vii) rights to unilaterally alter
other terms of the transferred assets, and (viii) language of documents and
conduct of parties.170 There is no standardized list of factors. Commentators
observe, however, that the two most important factors are price and recourse.
This section discusses arguments for both price and recourse as bases for
making true-sale determinations.
1. Recourse
True-sale analyses often focus on recourse—the extent to which the
seller of receivables remains liable for the receivables’ performance.171 A
high level of recourse, the logic goes, indicates that the purchaser did not
acquire risk that is consistent with ownership.172 However, sales of many
Bankruptcy of the Transferor, 65 AM. BANKR. L.J. 181, 186-98 (1991) (detailing the various
factors courts use in examining sale and loan determinations for purposes of the true-sale
doctrine).
169. See In re Woodson Co., 813 F.2d 266, 272 (9th Cir. 1987) (“Simply calling
transactions ‘sales’ does not make them so. Labels cannot change the true nature of the
underlying transactions.”); In re Golden Plan of California, Inc., 829 F.2d 705, 709 (9th Cir.
1986) (“Whether the parties intended outright sales or loans for security is determined from
all the facts and circumstances surrounding the transactions at issue.”); Major’s Furniture
Mart v. Castle Credit Corp., 602 F.2d 538, 544 (3d Cir. 1979) (“The question for the court
then is whether the nature of the recourse, and the true nature of the transaction, are such that
the legal rights and economic consequences of the agreement bear a greater similarity to a
financing transaction or to a sale.”); In re Commercial Loan Corp., 316 B.R. 690, 700 (Bankr.
N.D. Ill. 2004) (noting that courts do not rely on “any universally accepted set of factors” and
instead “different courts consider different factors and give those factors different weight”).
170. See Aicher & Fellerhoff, supra note 168, at 186-94.
171. See, e.g., Peter V. Pantaleo, et al, Rethinking the Role of Recourse in the Sale of
Financial Assets, 52 BUS. LAW. 159 (1996) (discussing how a buyer retaining recourse
complicates whether to view the transaction as a sale or a secured loan); Thomas E. Plank,
The True Sale of Loans and the Roles of Recourse, 14 GEO. MASON U. L. REV. 287 (1991)
(highlighting the uncertainty of true-sale determinations when an owner conveys loans with
credit recourse).
172. See generally, In re Qualia Clinical Serv., Inc., 441 B.R. 325, 329–32 (B.A.P. 8th
Cir. 2011); Nickey Gregory Co. LLC v. AgriCap, LLC, 597 F.3d. 591, 599–603 (4th Cir.
2010); In re Commercial Money Ctr., Inc., 350 B.R. 465, 480–85 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2006); In
re Contractor’s Equipment Supply Co., 861 F.2d 241, 245 (9th Cir. 1988); In re Woodson
Co., 813 F.2d 266, 270–72 (9th Cir. 1987); Major’s Furniture Mart, Inc. v. Castle Credit
Corp., 602 F.2d 538, 543–46 (3d Cir. 1979); In re Major Funding Corp., 82 B.R. 443, 447
(Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1987); In re S.O.A.W. Enterprises, 32 B.R. 279, 281–83 (Bankr. W.D. Tex.
1983); In re Evergreen Valley Resort, Inc. 23 B.R. 659, 661–62 (Bankr. D. Me. 1982); People
v. Service Institute Inc., 421 N.Y.S.2d 325, 326–27 (Sup. Ct. 1979).
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kinds of assets come with warranties of quality and other seller obligations
to ensure that assets meet purchasers’ requirements. The fact of recourse in
most contexts, standing alone, does not indicate a SISO rather than a true
sale.173
Commentators and securitization industry participants draw
distinctions among types of recourse—distinguishing credit recourse, from
warranty recourse, from guaranties of market value or yield.174 Collectability
recourse refers to provisions under which the seller guarantees assigned
receivables or agrees to repurchase receivables if the account obligor
defaults. These kinds of provisions are analogous to warranties of quality,
and therefore are consistent with true-sale characterization of the
receivables’ assignment. The buyer’s return is tied to performance of the
assets, in accordance with their terms; collectability recourse provisions are
like performance guarantees.
In contrast, economic recourse refers to provisions that warrant a return
to the buyer. Economic recourse indicates that the assignment is a SISO and
not a true sale. Provisions providing economic recourse to the buyer concern
more than just the quality of the assets; they warrant a return of the buyer’s
purchase price, plus a yield, that is unrelated to the receivables’ payment
terms.175
2. Price
Many consider price to be the most important factor to consider in
making a true-sale determination.176 Price can be complex to assess in the
receivables securitization context, which involves servicing arrangements,
recourse, etc., creating challenges to administering price-based true-sale

173. See, e.g., In re Commercial Loan Corp., 316 B.R. at 700–03 (noting that some courts
might find the recourse aspect of a transaction significant, while others may not); Goldstein
v. Madison Nat’l Bank, 89 B.R. 274, 276–79 (D.D.C. 1988) (determining that the existence
of a recourse provision is not dispositive).
174. See, e.g., Pantaleo, et al., supra note 1, at 162-63 (discussing two different types of
recourse – recourse for collectability and economic recourse). Some courts distinguish
between economic recourse and recourse for a breach of warranty, while other courts simply
identify “recourse provisions” without further explanation. See also In re Doctors Hosp. of
Hyde Park, Inc., 507 B.R. 558, 711-12 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2013) (acknowledging that “recourse
can take the form of a repurchase obligation or a guaranty of collectability by the seller, among
other forms.”); In re Major Funding Corp., 82 B.R. 443, 448 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1987).
175. Pantaleo, et al., supra note 1, at 162-63.
176. See, e.g., Aicher & Fellerhoff, supra note 168, at 206-10 (“If the effective price paid
(accounting for all recourse, purchase price holdbacks, overcollateralization with a retained
seller interest and similar devices) reasonably approximates what a willing buyer would pay
a willing seller, the court should not decide that such recourse devices require characterization
of the transaction as a loan.”).
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analyses.
If intent of the parties controls the characterization of a transaction,
property law considers the relationship between the purchase price and the
fair market value of the assets conveyed to illuminate the parties’ intent.
Price, for example, is a factor in equitable mortgage doctrine. If the price
paid looks like a sale price—meaning, there is not a material disparity
between the price and the value of the asset—then that seems like excellent
evidence that the parties intend a sale. The Restatement 3rd of Property
observes:
A substantial disparity between the value received by the grantor
and the fair market value of the land at the time of the
conveyance is strong evidence that security was intended. . . .
Normally rational people, other than in gift transactions,177 do not
transfer land without receiving a purchase price that
approximates its fair market value.178
Thomas Plank references equitable mortgage doctrine in his argument
for the relevance of price in true-sale analyses.179 He directs courts to look
to the parties’ characterization of the transaction, and assuming this threshold
criterion is met, “[t]he first and most significant element of economic
substance is the price paid for the loans.”180 Courts must assess the allocation
of burdens and benefits of ownership, and analyze the value of the
consideration for the transaction. Plank presents a methodology in which
courts would determine which party has the preponderance of burdens and
benefits of ownership.181 The adequacy of the purchase price, then, relates
to the allocation of burdens and benefits.182
Similarly, Aicher and Fellerhoff argue that levels and type of recourse,
per se, should not be determinative in true-sale cases. The issue, rather, is
whether recourse is reasonably priced into the transaction. As they put it,
the relevant question is:
[W]hat would an informed and willing buyer pay a willing seller
177. Property law recognizes transfers without any consideration at all—donative
transfers or gifts. In these cases, price is irrelevant, of course, to intent to effectuate a
conveyance. The type of property interest at issue here, though, is governed by UCC Article
9, which requires, among other things, that value be given in order to create an enforceable
security interest (whether SISO or sale). See U.C.C. § 9-203(b)(1) (requiring that value be
given to create a security interest enforceable against the debtor). Security interests under
UCC Article 9 cannot be donated or transferred as gifts; the codification of requirements for
recognition of this type of property interest precludes the possibility.
178. Restatement (Third) of Property: Mortgages § 3.2 (Am. Law Inst. 1997).
179. Plank, supra note 171, at 334-35.
180. Id. at 334.
181. Id. at 337-39.
182. Id.
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for a transfer of the entire bundle of risks and benefits embodied
in the cash flow represented by the receivables? If the ultimate
price that the transferee pays, taking into account the presence of
any direct and indirect recourse provisions, is notably less than this
amount, a court should conclude that the transaction is a secured
loan.183
The difficulty that their approach—along with Plank’s—presents is the
complexity of pricing a transfer involving complex valuations. As Aicher
and Fellerhoff acknowledge, the “ultimate price arrived at in a non-collusive,
arms-length bargain is the result of many factors, such as information
available to buyer and seller, diligence of seller in soliciting bids, relative
bargaining strength, and prevailing economic conditions and trends.”184
Buyers may demand discounts from the face value of receivables for
the time value of money and the risk of non-collection. This discount should
reflect a return greater than existing rates available on investment of the
purchase price in money market or other funds. Even this discounting may
be complex—the risk of non-collection, or default by account debtors, may
not be easy to determine based on historical default rates. These default rates
may not be relevant in current or future market conditions.
In addition to basic discounting for time value of money and predicted
default rate, other discounts may be desirable. There are efficiencies, for
example, surrounding seller risk retention. Sellers are in a better position
than buyers to know and minimize risk of default by account debtors. If the
seller did not have economic incentive to minimize this default risk, the
buyer would insist on a larger discount in the purchase price.185 By retaining
risk, a seller gets a more favorable overall price than if the buyer assumed all
risk.186
In other words, recourse can produce efficiencies. As such, recourse
should not, standing alone, be a basis for re-characterizing a receivables
conveyance. The task is to determine whether the price a seller receives
reflects a sale price, or is so heavily discounted and misaligned with risk
retention, that the transaction should be treated as a loan.
Despite the complexity of looking to price in true-sales determinations,
price remains a prominent component among commentators and appears to
be relevant to courts.187 If courts were to adopt Plank’s methodology, for
example, over time a more coherent doctrine could emerge, grounded in
holdings on what constitutes a preponderance of benefits or burdens of
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.

Aicher & Fellerhoff, supra note 168, at 207.
Id. at 209.
Aicher & Fellerhoff, supra note 168, at 209-10.
Id.
Id.
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ownership, and what percentages of face value of receivables tend to
correlate to such allocations of benefits and burdens. Parties arguing for a
characterization other than what these factors indicate, can then argue that
their deal is distinct and bear the burden of explaining and justifying their
specific allocation of risk and pricing. Part IV.A below raises the possibility
of codifying true-sale rules within UCC Article 9 that could facilitate this
kind of doctrinal development.188
An additional reason to consider price is fairness to unsecured creditors
of the seller. Commentators and lawmakers must consider when and why
purchasers of receivables should enjoy rights of exclusion against seller’s
creditors, especially non-adjusting creditors. A true-sale doctrine that
contemplates the value an originator receives in exchange for assets sold to
an SPE better protects third-party concerns than one that recognizes the
bankruptcy remoteness of assets that were assigned without a corresponding
infusion of comparable value to the originator.
B. Statutory approaches
In some jurisdictions, state statutes override the common-law true-sale
doctrine.189 With respect to originators that are banks subject to the Federal
Deposit Insurance Act, FDIC rules that override the common-law true-sale
doctrine may apply.
1.

ABS statutes

In jurisdictions that enact an asset-backed securities facilitation act,190
investors may enjoy rights of exclusion in receivables backing securities
despite the fact that the transaction pursuant to which the issuer acquired the
receivables would not be a true sale at common-law. ABS statutes respond
to concerns about the legal foundations of the multi-trillion dollar
securitization industry, especially following In re LTV Steel Company, Inc.191
Lawmakers worry that the securitization market could collapse if courts were
to find that assets assigned to collateralize securities are not the property of
the issuer, under the true-sale doctrine.192 ABS statutes attempt to override
188. See infra text accompanying notes 254-62.
189. See Thomas E. Plank, The Erie Doctrine and Bankruptcy, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
633, 653-58 (2004).
190. See ALA. CODE § 35-10A-2(a)(1) (2016); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, §§ 2701A-2703A
(West 2016); LA. STAT. ANN. § 10:9-109(e) (2016); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1109.75 (West
2016); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 53-425, 53-426 (West 2015); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 54-110 (2016); TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN § 9-109(e) (West 2015).
191. See supra text accompanying notes 159-167.
192. See Mann, supra note 13, at 1817 (relating the LTV Steel proceedings to a continuing
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this possibility, by sanctioning an ownership interest in receivables despite
the substantive scope of legal rights and obligations of the parties.193
In Delaware, for example, the ABS statute provides that “any property,
assets or rights purported to be transferred, in whole or in part, in . . .
securitization transactions shall be deemed to no longer be the property,
assets or rights of the transferor.”194 The statute does not define
“securitization” and indicates that the term is to be construed broadly. To
the extent that—as Ayotte and Gaon assert—securitization of necessary
assets can cause inefficient outcomes in bankruptcy, the Delaware ABS
statute could compound that inefficiency by fortifying investors’ hold-up
power vis-à-vis continuation funding for positive-value projects that require
collateral.195
To the extent that—as many commentators assert—
securitization can create inefficiencies by permitting investors and
originators to externalize costs into non-adjusting and non-consenting
creditors, this ABS statute could compound such inefficiencies. The statute
sanctions the bankruptcy-remote status of assets even in context where levels
of recourse and price indicate that the firm did not receive fair market value
for the assignment (thus aggravating the subsidy-from-unsecured-creditors
problem).196
Taking a slightly different approach, Texas has enacted non-uniform
UCC 9-109(e), which provides that:
The application of this chapter to the sale of accounts, chattel
paper, payment intangibles, or promissory notes is not to recharacterize that sale as a transaction to secure indebtedness but to
protect purchasers of those assets by providing a notice filing
system. For all purposes, in the absence of fraud or intentional
misrepresentation, the parties’ characterization of a transaction as
a sale of such assets shall be conclusive that the transaction is a
sale and is not a secured transaction and that title, legal and
equitable, has passed to the party characterized as the purchaser of
those assets regardless of whether the secured party has any
recourse against the debtor, whether the debtor is entitled to any
surplus, or any other term of the parties’ agreement.197
This form of ABS statute makes more sense than does Delaware’s freestanding statute. Texas’s UCC 9-109(e) ties ABS statute provisions to
transactions governed by Article 9, under 9-109(a)(3). In other words, this
push for legislative action on true sales); Janger, supra note 10, at 1776 (noting that the clamor
for ABS statutes became deafening after LTV).
193. See Mann, supra note 13, at 1818 (observing the striking effects of the ABS statutes).
194. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, §§ 2701A-2703A.
195. See supra text accompanying notes 106-21.
196. See supra text accompanying notes 66, 69, 71.
197. TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN § 9-109(e) (West 2015).
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statute applies to sale of “accounts, chattel paper, payment intangibles, or
promissory notes”—receivables and other replaceable assets. It does not
apply to any and all securitizations. Again, applying Ayotte and Gaon’s
assertions, this approach to true-sale rules could promote efficient outcomes
in bankruptcy. The assets subject to the statute are replaceable (meaning that
their bankruptcy-remote status does not create hold-up problems and forces
continuation lenders to look to the value of projects, rather than the capacity
to dilute existing lenders198), and the statute sets out to eliminate recharacterization risk. However, this section 9-109(e) sanctions the
bankruptcy-remote status of assets in a way that could aggravate
inefficiencies in the same way as other ABS statutes: by potentially
aggravating the extent to which securitization enables extraction of a subsidy
from non-adjusting creditors.199
These ABS statutes are the equivalent of passing a law stating that all
cars are blue for certain purposes.200 Not all cars are blue, but for legal
purposes in a specific context, all cars are now blue as a matter of law.201 In
fact, if we consider the ABS statutes in light of the property concept of
numerus clausus,202 “we can view [them] as legislative recognition of a
heretofore unknown form of property interest.”203
Given the incongruity between the substance of the ABS statutes and
doctrinal approaches to characterization of commercial transactions, the
effectiveness of these statutes is uncertain.204 In bankruptcy court, an
198. See supra text accompanying notes 117-20.
199. See supra text accompanying notes 68, 69, 71.
200. See Jeffrey M. Carbino & William H. Schorling, Delaware’s Asset-Backed
Securities Facilitation Act: Will the Act Prevent the Recharacterization of a Sale of
Receivables in a Seller’s Bankruptcy?, 6 DEL. L. REV. 367, 384-86 (2003) (noting explicitly
in the Delaware ABS statute that “[n]othing contained in this chapter shall be deemed to
require any securitization transaction to be treated as a sale for federal or state tax purposes
or to preclude the treatment of any securitization transaction as debt for federal or state tax
purposes . . . .”); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 2703A(b) (West 2003).
201. See Reaves Brokerage Co. Inc. v. Sunbelt Fruit and Vegetable Co. Inc. (336 F.3d
410, 417 (5th Cir. 2003) (exemplifying the fifth circuit’s decision not to apply UCC 9-109(e),
and thus finding a loan transaction rather than a sale despite the parties’ express designation).
The characterization at issue was not for purposes of securitization, but rather for purposes of
the Perishable Agricultural Commodities Act.
202. See infra text accompanying notes 240-45.
203. Hughes, supra note 13, at 220.
204. A handful of cases cite to various ABS statutes, but none challenges the
characterization of a transaction arguing that bankruptcy law, equity, or other property
principles warrant a characterization that contravenes an ABS statute. See Brothers. v. Saag,
No. 4:13-CV-466-VEH, 2014 WL 7330869, at *6 (N.D. Ala. Dec. 19, 2014) (rejecting the
argument that after the securitization transaction the defendant had no authority to foreclose);
In re Doctors Hosp. of Hyde Park, Inc., 507 B.R. 558 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2013); In re Argo Fin.,
Inc., 337 F.3d 516 (5th Cir. 2003); Tetra Applied Techs., Inc. v. H.O.E., Inc., 878 So. 2d 708
(3d Cir. 2004); Express Working Capital, LLC v. Starving Students, Inc., 28 F. Supp. 3d 660
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originator (either as DIP or via its bankruptcy trustee) could assert that
securitized assets were not conveyed to the SPE in a true sale, despite the
applicability of an ABS statute.205 The bankruptcy court could, potentially,
make a substantive determination on the true-sale status of the transaction,206
rather than a determination based on application of an ABS statute. As a
practical matter, the impact that the ABS statutes have on securitization
transactions depends upon the extent to which bankruptcy courts determine
that the bankruptcy code or other federal law or policy does not preempt the
ABS statutes.
Bankruptcy courts generally look to state law to determine the scope of
property interests held by the debtor.207 The basic rule is that state law
governs, but a bankruptcy court could find a property interest in
contravention of state law if it finds a countervailing federal interest208 as it
“ascertain[s] and give[s] effect to congressional intent.”209 In addition to
bankruptcy courts’ power to find a property interest in securitized assets
despite applicability of an ABS statute, some commentators suggest that the
plain language of Bankruptcy Code section 541210 expressly preempts state
ABS statutes.211
Others, however, contest this assertion, stating that while bankruptcy
law permits adjustment of the state law rights of insolvent debtors and their
creditors, bankruptcy law may not constitutionally impair the state law rights
(N.D. Tex. 2014).
205. See Mann, supra note 13, at 1806-07 (discussing federalism and the tension between
state statutes, such as ABS statutes, and bankruptcy policy in the commercial finance context).
206. See Plank supra note 189 (observing that bankruptcy courts differ from Article III
courts with powers of equity, such that it is inaccurate to describe bankruptcy courts as
exercising equitable powers when they modify creditors’ and debtors’ interests).
207. See Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 50 (1979) (using state law to resolve the
question of “whether a security interest in property extends to rents and profits derived from
the property”). Cf. infra text accompanying notes 265-70.
208. Id. at 55. See also In re Omegas Group, Inc. 16 F.3d 1443, 1450 (6th Cir. 1994)
(stating that “just because something is so under state law does not necessarily make it so
under the Bankruptcy Code” as after state property law questions are determined, bankruptcy
law dictates to what extent property is part of the estate).
209. Matter of Roach, 824 F.2d 1370, 1374 (3d Cir. 1987).
210. See 11 U.S.C. § 541(c)(1).
211. See supra Carbino & Schorling, note 200, at 384-85 (asserting that “an argument
exists that the plain language of Bankruptcy Code section 541 expressly preempts the
Securitization Act”). See also Edward M. Iacobucci and Ralph A. Winter, Asset Securitization
and Asymmetric Information, 34 J. LEGAL STUD. 161, 186 (2005) (stating that “[w]hile there
is authority supporting the notion that federal bankruptcy proceedings should respect state law
sales definitions that affect third parties . . . courts may conclude that federal bankruptcy law
preempts these state law reforms”); Kenneth C. Kettering, True Sale of Receivables: A
Purposive Analysis, 16 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 511, 524-26 (2008) (arguing “there is a
powerful argument that these state anti-[re-characterization] statutes would be preempted by
the Bankruptcy Code in any adjudication of what constitutes property of the debtor’s estate.”).

HUGHES_FINAL_EIC ADJ_JUSTIFIED FOONOTE (DO NOT DELETE)

2017]

12/6/2017 10:00 AM

PROPERTY AND THE TRUE-SALE DOCTRINE

909

of third parties.212 Whether this view precludes an express-preemption-based
rejection of an ABS statute in bankruptcy, however, seems to turn on whether
the conveyance at issue was a sale. If the assignment of assets securitized
was a sale, then investors are third parties, who invested in assets owned by
an SPE. If the assignment is not a sale, then they are construed as creditors.
This question needs further illumination by lawmakers. As of yet, the only
conclusion we can draw is that the ABS statutes’ effects in bankruptcy are
unsettled.
2. FDIC rules
When a securitization originator is a bank subject to FDIC regulations,
those regulations may determine the scope of the bank’s bankruptcy estate.213
These regulations state that the FDIC shall not re-characterize as property of
the institution any financial assets transferred by an insured depository
institution in connection with a securitization or participation, provided that
such transfer meets all conditions for sale accounting treatment under
generally accepted accounting principles, other than the “legal isolation”
condition.214
“Legal isolation” under the FDIC rules means “that transferred financial
212. See Thomas E. Plank, The Constitutional Limits of Bankruptcy, 63 TENN. L. REV.
487, 559-81 (1996) (discussing the limits of bankruptcy power); Plank supra note 189.
213. See Julian B. McDonnell & James P. Nehf, SECURED TRANSACTIONS UNDER THE
UCC § 34.05 (2015) (stating that:
The FDIC principally regulates securitizations originated by insured institutions
through its Securitization Rule, which is stated at 12 CFR Section 360.6. Prior to
the 2007–2008 financial crisis, this regulation provided that the FDIC would not
use its authority as receiver or conservator under 12 U.S.C. Section 1821(e)(1) to
disaffirm or repudiate securitizations provided they met the conditions for sale
accounting treatment under generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP).
Before the meltdown of 2007–2008, the GAAP were found in FAS 140 issued by
the Financial Accounting Standard Board.)
214. This regulation states:
[T]he FDIC as conservator or receiver shall not, in the exercise of its statutory
authority to disaffirm or repudiate contracts, reclaim, recover, or recharacterize
as property of the institution or the receivership any such transferred financial
assets, provided that such transfer satisfies the conditions for sale accounting
treatment under generally accepted accounting principles, except for the “legal
isolation” condition that is addressed by this section. The foregoing paragraph
shall apply to a last-in, first-out participation, provided that the transfer of a
portion of the financial asset satisfies the conditions for sale accounting treatment
under generally accepted accounting principles that would have applied to such
portion if it had met the definition of a “participating interest,” except for the
“legal isolation” condition that is addressed by this section.
12 CFR § 360.6(d)(1).
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assets have been put presumptively beyond the reach of the transferor, its
creditors, a trustee in bankruptcy, or a receiver, either by a single transaction
or a series of transactions taken as a whole.”215
Like the ABS statutes, the FDIC rules create a safe harbor for sale
treatment. They are more complex than those enacted in state ABS statutes,
however, because the FDIC rules limit the scope of economic interest the
safe harbor creates in reference to other, federal regulations concerning risk
retention in securitization transactions. Since their enactment in 2000, the
FDIC rules have been revised twice. They were revised in 2010 in response
to 2009 revisions to accounting standards216 and the 2010 passage of The
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act.217 The rules
were revised again in 2015 in response to promulgation of new risk-retention
regulations under Section 15G of the Securities Exchange Act.218
Federal regulations regarding risk retention in securitization are
designed, among other things, to mitigate moral hazard concerns associated
with originate-to-distribute lending models. These regulations that the FDIC
true-sale rules coincide with are not designed to (and do not accomplish)
improving the coherence of the true-sale doctrine. As far as true-sale rules
are concerned, the FDIC approach is problematic for the same reasons that
the ABS statutes are: they create rights of exclusions in an originator’s assets
without sufficient regard for why and when investors should have such
rights, given efficiency or fairness considerations.219
C. Harris and Mooney property-based approach
Harris and Mooney state that price should not be relevant in a propertybased approach to characterizing true sales.220 They also eschew the
relevance of recourse.221 This section presents their approach, finding that it
lays a useful foundation for a more coherent doctrine, but ultimately is
incomplete.
Their “property-based methodology” for true-sale
determinations does not sufficiently substantiate the concept of “economic
interest.” Their analogy between the true-sale context and the true-lease
context does not fully illuminate important differences between these two
215. 12 CFR § 709.10(a)(3).
216. See FAS 166, 167, supra note 145-50.
217. 12 U.S.C. § 5301 (2006 & Supp. 2011).
218. 15 U.S.C. 78a et seq., added by Section 941(b) of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street
Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 12 U.S.C. § 5301 (2006 & Supp. 2011).
219. See supra text accompanying notes 66-121, 237-49.
220. See Harris & Mooney, supra note 31, at 1044-47, 1062, 1074-75.
221. See Harris & Mooney, supra note 31, at 1042, 1072 (explaining that while a buyer’s
reliance on recourse may prompt further analysis of a transaction, it should not carry any
weight in the actual analysis itself).
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deal types. Harris and Mooney imply that classifying an approach as
“property-based” is dispositive on the relevance of deal characterization to
third parties.222 Yet much of property law concerns the question of when and
why private law rules should recognize rights of exclusion.223
Harris and Mooney argue that “a transaction should be re-characterized
as a SISO if the interest transferred to the purported buyer is in fact not the
functional and economic equivalent of ownership but rather the functional
and economic equivalent of a security interest that secures an obligation.”224
To determine whether the buyer has the functional and economic equivalent
of ownership, they argue, the only relevant questions are whether the
purported seller has retained a meaningful interest in the receivables, and
whether the interest transferred to the purported buyer secures an
obligation.225 They state that their approach is property-based: it focuses
solely on whether the seller retains an economic interest in the receivables
that secures an obligation—not on factors such as recourse or price.226
In order to determine if a seller retains an economic interest, they argue,
we should look to established rules in the true-lease context.227 The law
governing whether a lease of goods creates a true lease or a security interest
is well-developed and mostly codified in UCC Article 1-203.228 Transactions
that cannot be classified by application of UCC 1-203 alone, however, still
require factors-based, case-by-case analysis.229 The key feature defining a
true lease is that the lessor enjoys a meaningful residual interest; the asset
has continuing economic life after the end of the lease term, giving value to
the lessor’s residual interest. If the transaction is structured in such a way
that the lessor does not expect to recover the goods unless the lessee defaults
on payments, then the lessee has the functional and economic equivalent of

222. See Harris & Mooney, supra note 31; see also Steven L. Harris & Charles W.
Mooney, Jr., A Property-Based Theory of Security Interests: Taking Debtors’ Choices
Seriously, 80 VA. L. REV. 2021 (1994).
223. Enforcement of a property interest requires attention to the bases for rights of
exclusion. Numerous theories of property focus on rights of exclusion. See Singer, supra
note 12. Property theorists, though, are not unanimous on the centrality of exclusion. Cf.
Gregory S. Alexander, Governance Property, 160 U. PENN. L. REV. 1853, 1854-60 (2012)
(describing property in terms of mechanisms of internal governance and arguing that we can
no longer regard the right to exclude as the single most important aspect of ownership).
224. Harris & Mooney, supra note 31, at 1050.
225. Id. at 1032.
226. Id.
227. Id. at 1049-56.
228. For a summary of true-lease doctrine, see JAMES J. WHITE & G. ERIC BRUNSTAD, JR.,
SECURED TRANSACTIONS TEACHING MATERIALS 117-21 (4th ed. 2013).
229. See, e.g., Duke Energy Royal, LLC v. Pillowtex Corp., 349 F.3d 711, 719 (3d Cir.
2003) (stating that where statutory factors are not met, courts will look to “the economic
reality of the transaction in order to determine” whether the transaction is a true lease).
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ownership (encumbered by the lessor’s security interest).230
Harris and Mooney argue that true-lease laws provide the appropriate
framework for undertaking true-sales analyses for securitized receivables.
“The analysis of a purported true sale of receivables,” they state, “is the
mirror image of the true lease analysis.”231 Their analysis proceeds, however,
without sufficient discussion of the different purposes, contexts, and effects
of equipment leases, as opposed to receivables securitizations. Their
objective is to identify economic interests in receivables (that secure
obligations), based on an analogy to residual interests in leased equipment,
without discussion of the different implications of these deal types.
An “economic interest” in leased equipment, in Harris and Mooney’s
analysis, is a residual interest—the value of the equipment at the end of the
lease. An “economic interest” in receivables, in their view, is any retained
or re-acquired rights, of the seller, to collect on receivables.232 They do not
explain or justify when and why “economic interests” are property interests.
For example, lessees have an “economic interest”—a present possessory
interest and use rights—in equipment that they have leased (in a true lease).
We can describe originators as having an “economic interest” in securitized
receivables, in the sense that they rely on proceeds of a securitization facility
and retain equity of the SPE. Originators may also have an “economic
interest” in the sense that they may have exposure to risk through recourse
provisions. Harris and Mooney state conclusively that any economic interest
associated with recourse provisions is not a property interest, just as a surety
acquires no property interest in the obligation it guarantees absent
assignment or subrogation.233
The question for policy-makers is: what should the scope of property
rights be, given the economic substance of a transaction? The mere assertion
that true-sale status should turn on whether a seller retains an “economic
interest” in receivables is incomplete. Policy-makers should undertake the
task of elucidating what it means to have a property interest in receivables
and when and why such an interest exists. Harris and Mooney approach this
question as if it were a purely descriptive one, when, in actuality, property
law is rich with differing concepts and theories on which lawmakers may
draw in determining the proper scope of any given type of interest. The
purpose here is to argue that true-sale rules should reflect normative
commitments that are in accord with policy-makers’ views on the efficiency
and desirability of securitization. If Harris and Mooney’s proposal is driven
230.
118.
231.
232.
233.

See Harris & Mooney, supra note 31, at 1051; White & Brunstad, supra note 228, at
Harris & Mooney, supra note 31, at 1052.
See Harris & Mooney, supra note 31, at 1053.
See Harris & Mooney, supra note 15, at 1072.
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by a particular view of property, or by normative commitment to a policy on
securitization, these aspects of their thinking are undisclosed.
As discussed above, Ayotte and Gaon assess how the implications of
bankruptcy remoteness differ, depending on whether the bankruptcy remote
asset is replaceable or, conversely, necessary to the firm’s operations.234
Receivables are a replaceable asset—their value functions like cash.
Equipment, on the other hand, is a necessary asset. Bankruptcy remoteness
of replaceable assets promotes efficient commitments to re-organization,
versus liquidation, in bankruptcy.235 Bankruptcy remoteness of necessary
assets, on the other hand, can promote inefficient liquidations.236 From the
vantage point of Ayotte and Gaon’s findings, the true-lease/true-sale analogy
that Harris and Mooney support becomes more complex.
Ayotte and Gaon are discussing the value of bankruptcy remoteness in
the context of securitization of different types of assets, whereas Harris and
Mooney are comparing securitization of receivables to a lease of equipment
(in which the asset is bankruptcy remote in the sense that it is property of a
lessor, not in the sense that it has been sold to an SPE). The mechanism by
which bankruptcy remoteness occurs in these two deal types, however, is not
consequential for this analysis. If efficiency in bankruptcy is an important
policy consideration, then before we can conclude that the true-sale doctrine
for receivables should track the true-lease doctrine, we should consider the
objectives and implications of such an approach.
In addition to the different implications of equipment leases, versus
receivables securitizations, for continuation-versus-liquidation decisions,
these deals have different implications for unsecured creditors. A true-lease
characterization of a deal in the context of a lessee bankruptcy entitles the
lessor to continuing lease payments. The lessee can continue to use and
generate income with the leased equipment so long as it makes payments to
the lessor. In contrast, true-sale characterization of an assignment of
receivables in the context of an originator bankruptcy means that only
investors in asset-backed securities can reach the assets, depriving the
bankruptcy estate of an important source of income.
Harris and Mooney claim to espouse a “property-based methodology”
for distinguishing sales of receivables from SISOs.237 What makes a
methodology “property-based,” and why is that designation important?
234. See Ayotte & Gaon, supra note 7, at 1312-16.
235. See id.
236. See id.
237. Harris and Mooney also argue, in the debate over UCC Article 9, for a property-law
framework as justification for full-priority secured lending. See Harris & Mooney, supra note
15. Just as in the securitization context, the characterization of security interests as property
conveyances does not warrant dismissal of policy concerns surrounding when and why
property law bestows rights of exclusion.
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They do not distinguish their “property-based” method from a “factors”
method that considers distribution of surplus collections or seller retention
of interests along with economic recourse provisions. They do not
sufficiently define or theorize the “economic interest” that, along with an
obligation secured, should be grounds for SISO classification. Nonetheless,
Harris and Mooney are correct to argue for an approach to true sales that is
explicitly rooted in property law.
III.

PROPERTY AND RECEIVABLES CONVEYANCES: BETTER FRAMING
FOR TRUE SALES

Current approaches to the true-sale doctrine do not squarely address the
scope of the property interest the doctrine determines. Factors-based
approaches suppress the centrality of property, focusing on the terms of deal
documents as if the characterization question were a matter of contract
interpretation of consequence only to the transacting parties. Statutory safe
harbors deem transactions to be legal sales based on contract terms, rather
than on substantive assessment of the interest created.
The true-sale doctrine implicates questions that are at the heart of
property law—about exclusion, efficiency and information, governance,
morality, etc. Framing this doctrine in property terms can facilitate a more
coherent approach to distinguishing ownership interests from SISOs. So far,
this Article has linked formulations of the true-sale doctrine to arguments
about the efficiency and desirability of securitization, enabling lawmakers to
make informed policy-based choices about the scope of property interest in
receivables that constitutes an ownership interest conveyed in a sale. This
part identifies two property-law concepts—numerus clausus and rights of
exclusion—that are integral to the true-sale doctrine. It describes how these
concepts apply in the receivables securitization context. Drawing on these
concepts could lead to clearer formulations of true-sale rules.
In discussing the confused state of the common-law true-sale doctrine,
Pantaleo, et al., state:
Under contract law, parties generally are free to enter into and
enforce any contract that is not illegal or against public policy;
there is nothing about recourse, for example, that either is illegal
or in violation of public policy. Common law favors the free
transfer of rights to receive money where there are no significant
externalities that have consequences to third parties. There is no
legal or public policy which precludes a transfer from improving
the value of an asset sold by adding its own guarantee.238

238. Pantaleo, et al., supra note 1, at 159-60.
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The provisions of a securitization transaction that create recourse or
express purchase price or ensure that one or the other party receives surplus
collections are all, as a matter of contract law, perfectly enforceable. The
question at issue in the true-sale doctrine is necessarily a property question:
what scope of rights or interest does the transaction create? Yet, much of the
literature on true-sale rules declines to discuss this—perhaps because it is
obvious, or perhaps because of the notion that there is no viable or
consequential distinction to be made between contract law and property
law.239
Numerus clausus. We can understand the true-sale doctrine as an
example of the concept of numerus clausus. Conceptually, we refer to
“numerus clausus” to express the notion that property law permits only
legally recognizable interests. The phrase numerus clausus means “the
number is closed.”240 This phrase expresses a principle of property law that
239. See Hughes, supra note 13, at 184-86, 195-96. See, e.g., Thomas C. Grey, The
Disintegration of Property, 22 NOMOS 69 (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds.
1980). The view that a contracts/property distinction lacks viability or consequence is
contested. Hughes, supra note 13, at 184-85. For example, contemporary corporate law
literature actively engages the question of whether property law—as distinct from contract
law—matters. Id.
240. In case law and other legal materials, the principle of numerus clausus relates
primarily to the rule against creation of new estates. See, e.g., Johnson v. Whiton, 34 N.E.
542, 542 (Mass. 1893) (holding that “an estate descending only to heirs on the father’s side
was a new kind of inheritance” and therefore not enforceable by law). The most widely-cited
explication of numerus clausus in U.S. property laws is by Thomas Merrill and Henry Smith,
most notably in Optimal Standardization in the Law of Property: The Numerus Clausus
Principle, 110 YALE L. J. 1 (2000) (explaining numerus clausus in economic terms). Because
property rights are in rem, third parties must invest in determining the scope of these rights.
Id. at 8. Property rights that are unusual are more costly to assess. Id. “Those creating or
transferring idiosyncratic property rights cannot always be expected to take these increases in
measurement costs fully into account,” Merrill and Smith explain, “making them a true
externality.” Id. The rules that effectuate the numerus clausus principle in property law
reduce these measurement costs. Id. Not all scholars agree with the view of numerus clausus
presented by Merrill and Smith. These critics, however, do not reject the concept that
standardization, or a stable set of forms of interest, is beneficial to markets and relates to the
capacity of third parties to comprehend interests. For example, Hansmann and Kraakman
concede that there must be some institution that enables third parties to determine who
controls various incidents of ownership; this institution does not have to take the form of
numerus clausus rules however. Lee Anne Fennell contends that a state-run “option
exchange” for property interests would be superior to the rules of numerus clausus for
balancing third-party information costs with the need for effectuating parties’ interests. See
Lee Anne Fennell, Property and Precaution, 4 J. TORTS L. 1, 53-59 (2011) (a governmentrun “option exchange” for property interests would better balance effectuating parties’ intent
with third party information costs than do rules of numerus clausus); Henry Hansmann &
Reinier Kraakman, Property, Contract, and Verification: The Numerus Clausus Problem and
the Divisibility of Rights, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 373, 382-83, 398 (2002) (the state need not
regulate the content of property rights, so long as some institution exists to enable third parties
to identify those who control the various incidents of ownership); Tamar Frankel, The Law of
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appears across legal systems—property interests must adhere to legally
recognizable, standardized forms.241 In terms of the true-sale doctrine,
contracting parties cannot create a new, unrecognized form of property
interest. The common law recognizes the conveyance of an ownership
interest (rather than a SISO) only when the level of recourse, or the price, or
other factors, or a statutory designation, create legal obligations consistent
with an ownership interest in the purchaser.242
The explicit use of a numerus clausus framework for analyzing truesale questions could potentially facilitate coherence.243 Lawmakers could
articulate packages of recourse and price that constitute sales as matter of
law, and then test individual transactions against recognized templates.244
Scholars have identified the potential of numerus clauses as a strategy to
reduce information costs surrounding property interests in other contexts.
For example, Jill Fisch discusses numerus clausus rules to argue that
interests in mutual funds should come in standardized forms, to reduce
information costs. She argues for a “conform or explain” approach, where
Cross-Border Securitization: Lex Juris, 12 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L. L. 475, 482-83 (2002)
(where standardization is optimal, transacting parties tend to produce it regardless of legal
restrictions on form); Nestor M. Davidson, Standardization and Pluralism in Property Law,
61 VAND. L. REV. 1597, 1600-03 (2008) (numerus clausus relates to the need for a stable set
of forms through which to express property rules evolving in response to competing social
goals); Avihay Dorfman, Property and Collective Undertaking: The Principle of Numerus
Clausus, 61 U. TORONTO L. J. 467, 471-74, 478, 490, 405-05, 517 (2011) (criticizing Merrill
and Smith for implying that a limited set of interests is superior to a larger one, for rooting
property law in exclusive use, and for arguing that only legislators may create new property
interests); Hanoch Dagan, The Craft of Property, 91 CALIF. L. REV. 1517, 1565-68 (2003)
(departing from Merrill and Smith to argue that the numerus clausus principle works because
parties to a transaction have expectations about how institutions work, rather than because of
its external effects such as on information costs). Cf. Amnon Lehavi, The Property Puzzle,
96 GEO. L. J. 1987 (2008) (arguing that Merrill and Smith as well as viewpoints by others do
not “capture the essence of property”).
241. See Merrill & Smith, supra note 240, at 4 (claiming “the principle that
property rights must conform to certain standardized forms” has no name in common law and
adopting the phrase “numerus clausus”).
242. Property law invokes a different justificatory framework than contract law.
Lawmakers can become caught in a discourse which market regulation, or holdings that
decline to enforce transactions, are viewed as interfering with markets by curtailing market
actors’ freedom of contract. From a property perspective, though, applying or developing
legal rules to balance the intentions of market actors with collective and third-party concerns
is just proper administration of the legal infrastructure of markets. Property law necessarily
balances the need for liquidity with third-party concerns. See Hughes, supra note 13, at 182.
243. The concept of numerus clausus, in and of itself, does not speak to the issue of
whether property consists of in rem rights in assets, or of aggregated legal relations. Hughes,
supra note 13, at 211-16.
244. Cf. Jill E. Fisch, Rethinking the Regulation of Securities Intermediaries, 158 U. PA.
L. REV. 1961, 2030 (2010) (referencing numerus clausus rules to argue that interests in mutual
funds should only come in standardized forms in order to drive down information costs).
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financial transactions either conform to a recognized, widely understood
form or the parties explain—meaning make explicit—the differences.245
Rules that encourage standardization of receivables assignments for
securitization could potentially bring clarity to the true-sale doctrine,
increasing certainty and thereby reducing re-characterization risk.
Some may object to this idea, on grounds that bespoke receivables
securitizations involve complex, deal-specific negotiation surrounding
allocation of risks and returns—and the parties’ tolerance for recharacterization risk. (Bankruptcy and litigation of the true-sale question
may be remote possibilities.) The capacity of transacting parties to create
contracts that reflect preferences specific to a given deal or asset pool or
counterparty contributes to lowering costs of capital for originators. Lower
costs of capital benefit non-adjusting creditors as well as originators: any
regulation of the parties’ freedom of contract in securitizing receivables
would potentially harm all relevant parties.
Such thinking deserves due consideration. However, the task here is to
think through how to generate a more coherent, policy-based true-sale
doctrine, given the doctrine’s consequences. If lawmakers, through public
discourse and policy debates, determine that the best approach to true sales
is, for example, to permit transacting parties to elect the status of their
transaction by contract, regardless of its economic substance, then so be it.
But to date we have no record of any such deliberation, and we have truesale rules that differ across jurisdictions, with no clear or consistent doctrinal
indicia for characterizing a receivables conveyance. Given that true-sale
rules are property rules, the concept of numerus clausus could very well
facilitate a legal landscape in which third parties have better information
about securitization transactions, administrative and transaction costs are
lower, and bankruptcy outcomes are more predictable. Lower transaction
costs contribute to lower costs of capital. Predictability and ease of
administration of the doctrine lower costs of bankruptcy and litigation,
potentially preserving assets for distribution to all creditors.
Rights of exclusion. A successful approach to the true-sale doctrine
must explain and justify investors’ rights of exclusion against a company’s
unsecured creditors. This justification may lie in the position that
securitization is efficient and therefore benefits unsecured creditors along
with investors and originators. Or, justification may be grounded in other
concerns. Regardless of efficiency, policymakers may say, an originator and
investors cannot claim rights of exclusion against unsecured creditors unless
the scope of the interest conveyed to the SPE clearly warrants such exclusion
based on public policy, or on moral theories or labor theories of property, for
245. Id.
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example.
Property theorists debate the status of exclusion as the sine qua non of
property interests.246 It is not necessary here to engage the scholarly debate
over whether rights of exclusion are central to property as a theoretical
matter. The relevance of exclusion, here, is that the true-sale doctrine
determines the extent to which investors may exclude unsecured creditors
from securitized assets. This framing of the true-sale question emphasizes
policy considerations concerning the efficiency and distributive impact of
asset-backed securitizations.247
We may conceive of securitized receivables as ‘things’ from which
property rights holders may exclude others,248 or, conversely, as bundles of
rights including the right of exclusion.249 Either way, exclusion of unsecured
creditors is (in any given context) efficient or inefficient, just or unjust.
Approaching the true-sale analysis as a question about exclusion directs
courts and lawmakers to consider when, why and how property interests
should confer such rights. Such an approach differs from current approaches
in which the law appears to consider the terms of transactions among
sophisticated commercial actors in the abstract, as a set of contracts that
results in one classification or the other depending on how the deal terms
map onto a jurisdiction’s true-sale rules.
Some may respond, here, that current true-sale rules do express policy
determinations about rights of exclusion. The ABS statutes are explicitly
designed to exclude unsecured creditors from originators’ securitized assets,
so long as transacting parties use certain contract terms. And regardless of
any given state’s approach to true-sale rules, bankruptcy law permits judges
to exercise discretion.250 A judge may, potentially, find an interest in
securitized assets in situations where the judge finds exclusion of unsecured
creditors from the bankruptcy estate to be unwarranted.251
246. See e.g., Henry E. Smith, The Thing about Exclusion, 3 BRIGHAM-KANNER PROP.
RTS. CONF. J. 95, 98-103 (2014) (arguing that the right to exclude is not the “sine qua non of
property”); Henry E. Smith, Property as the Law of Things, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1691, 1693
(2012) (arguing that “[t]he purposes of property relate to our interest in using things” and
“[t]here is no interest in exclusion per se”); Larissa Katz, Exclusion and Exclusivity in
Property Law, 58 U. TORONTO L.J. 275, 275 (2008) (proposing a different model for
understanding ownership); Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Demystifying the Right to Exclude: Of
Property, Inviolability, and Automatic Injunctions, 31 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 593, 593
(2008) (arguing that exclusion derives from the norm of inviolability); Thomas W. Merrill,
Property and the Right to Exclude, 77 NEB. L. REV. 730, 730 (1998) (arguing that the right to
exclude is the sine qua non of property).
247. See supra text accompanying notes 68-72.
248. See e.g., Smith, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1691 (2012), supra note 246.
249. See e.g., Grey, supra note 239.
250. See infra text accompanying notes 266-70. Cf. Plank, supra note 189, at 669.
251. See, e.g., text accompanying notes 159-64 (discussing In re LTV Steel Co., Inc.) and
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To the extent that true-sale and bankruptcy rules do contemplate the
justification—on efficiency, fairness, or other grounds—for finding rights of
exclusion in investors, against unsecured creditors, the true-sale doctrine
would benefit from a more explicit statement to this effect. Lawmakers and
judges have not explicitly considered the doctrine in terms of property and
exclusion; doing so could help to add justificatory depth and normative
direction to true-sale determinations.
IV.

REFORM POSSIBILITIES

This part identifies possibilities for how lawmakers could approach
reforming the true-sale doctrine in a way that considers the relationship
between arguments about the efficiency of securitization and normative
positions on true-sale rules.252 Section A sketches an idea for codifying a new
approach to true sales within UCC Article 9. Section B discusses the fact that
true-sale doctrine codification at the federal level (in the bankruptcy code)
has been proposed before and could be possible again.253
A. U.C.C. Article 9
Article 9 governs a particular type of property interest—the security
interest—setting forth the rules for effective creation, enforceability and
priority of such interests. Texas and Louisiana have already codified truesale rules in UCC Article 9, as discussed above.254 This section will not
further discuss those rules. Commentators who take the position that it
advances efficiency to eliminate re-characterization risk with an ABS statute
may support enactment of non-uniform section 9-109(e).255
This section raises the possibility of looking to sections 9-203, 9-109,
and UCC Article 1, to enact an approach to true sales of receivables that links
true-sale status to the adequacy of purchase price. This discussion is
preliminary: it is an idea for how we might use concepts in the U.C.C. to
codify a more consistent and policy-based set of true-sale rules for the
receivables securitization context.256 In UCC Article 9 terms, the true-sale
test determines when assignments of the assets covered by 9-109(a)(3)
206-14 (discussing possible federal pre-emption of ABS statutes in bankruptcy).
252. Any state-level codification of true-sale rules could face the same preemption
possibilities in bankruptcy that the ABS statutes face. See supra text accompanying notes 20412.
253. See infra text accompanying notes 271-85.
254. See supra text accompanying notes 42, 77.
255. See supra text accompanying notes 73-92.
256. A more complete proposal for Article 9 true-sale provisions is beyond this Article’s
capacity; it is the subject of a separate project.
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constitute SISOs within the scope of 9-109(a)(1), versus when they
constitute sales within the scope of 9-109(a)(3).
A thorough presentation of this idea would require analysis of: (i) why,
from a policy standpoint, lawmakers should codify the relevance of price in
true-sale determinations,257 and (ii) the function and formulation of the UCC
Article 9 provisions mentioned here, to explore whether they would be
appropriate sites for true-sale law reform. Neither of these tasks is within
this Article’s capacity. The first task would involve taking the analysis that
this Article provides, applying arguments about securitization’s efficiency
and fairness to build a position in favor of an approach that finds investors’
rights of exclusion to be justified when investors have paid an adequate price
for their interest. The second task involves detailed research into history,
functionality, and policy objectives embodied in UCC sections 9-109 and 9203, among others, along with the provisions of UCC Article 1.
As previously discussed, a true-sale doctrine that turns on price
considerations is complex and potentially difficult to administer, given the
various factors (recourse, market direction, bargaining position, historical
default rates) that legitimately affect a fair price for receivables.258 Given
this complexity, a statutory formulation of complete true-sale criteria
grounded in price may be infeasible. It is feasible, however, to consider
provisions that codify the relevance of price and allocate burdens of proof
with respect to the adequacy of price.
If lawmakers wanted to codify the relevance of price in true-sale
determinations, they could draft provisions for UCC Article 1 that reference
adequacy of price in defining a “true sale” of receivables.259 Or, consider a
provision linking the “value given”260 for purposes of section 9-203(b)(1) to
the distinction between deals covered by section 9-109(a)(1) (i.e., SISOs),
versus those covered by 9-109(a)(3) (i.e., sales of receivables). UCC Article
9, in section 9-109, could establish that, in order to fall within the scope of
section 9-109(a)(3)—and not 9-109(a)(1)—the value given, pursuant to 9203(b)(1) must reflect a fair market price for the assets assigned, considering
the terms of the assignment. The code could then allocate the burden of
proof—to either the debtor or the purchaser—with respect to the adequacy
of the purchase price for purposes of classifying a deal under 9-109(a).261
257. Cf. supra text accompanying notes 175-88.
258. See supra text accompanying notes 175-88.
259. Harris and Mooney’s proposal depends on an analogy between true leases and true
sales of receivables. See Harris & Mooney, supra note 15. UCC Article 1 provides a
definition of true lease. See U.C.C. § 1-203. Lawmakers could elaborate on that analogy and
undertake an Article 1 proposal for true sales.
260. See U.C.C. § 9-203(b)(1). The UCC defines “value” in section 1-204.
261. Again, a separate project undertakes the task of analyzing the relevant sections of
UCC 9 in detail to present and assess this schema.
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The “value given” requirement for attachment of a security interest is a
consideration requirement. Contract law requires consideration to create a
legally binding agreement. UCC Article 9 requires consideration to create a
legally enforceable security interest—a contractual lien. Contract law does
not test the adequacy of consideration. Property law, however, will consider
the adequacy of consideration to determine the scope of property interest that
a transaction creates. It does so, for example, when it considers the price of
a real estate conveyance to determine whether equitable mortgage rules
require treating a lease transaction as, instead, a sale with mortgage
financing.262
The type of statutory approach sketched here would not eliminate the
need for courts to consider factors in characterizing any given deal. It could,
however, establish the relevance of one factor—price—and set burdens of
proof in order to generate precedents that create useful categories for
characterizing (and structuring) receivables securitizations going forward.
B. Bankruptcy law
Generally speaking, state property law determines the scope of a
bankrupt entity’s estate. In Butner v. United States263 the Court expressed
the principle that “property interests are created and defined by state law.”264
This principle suggests that bankruptcy law may not be an appropriate
context in which to effectuate a property-based reform of the true-sale
doctrine. If state law defines property interests, then bankruptcy is largely
procedural.265 State law establishes when a property interest confers rights
of exclusion consistent with ownership (acquired in a sale), as opposed to
security (acquired as collateral for a loan). Bankruptcy law, then,
administers disposition of assets depending on whether, under state law, the
bankrupt entity retains a property interest in assets sufficient for a bankruptcy
trustee’s lien to attach.
This general schema is over-simplified, however. Scholars such as
Barry Adler and Edward J. Janger complicate the Butner principle by
illuminating continuity between bankruptcy law and property law—and also

262. See supra text accompanying notes 179-80.
263. 440 U.S. 48, 55 (1979).
264. Id. See also Raleigh v. Illinois Dep’t of Revenue, 530 U.S. 15, 20 (2000); BFP v.
Resolution Trust Corp., 511 U.S. 531, 545 (1994); Nobelman v. American Savings Bank, 508
U.S. 324, 329 (1993); Barnhill v. Johnson, 503 U.S. 393, 398-99 (1992).
265. See Barry E. Adler, Bankruptcy as property law, in KENNETH AYOTTE AND HENRY
E. SMITH EDS., RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF PROPERTY LAW (2011)
(contesting the Butner principle and arguing for expression of the property-law aspects of
bankruptcy and the insolvency law aspects of property).
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between property law and issues of insolvency.266 The question of whether
and when federal bankruptcy law does or should recognize legal rights of
exclusion from assets is complex. Lawmakers could consider the bankruptcy
code as a potential site for establishing a more coherent true-sale doctrine.267
Excavating the questions of federalism that this position would raise is
beyond this project’s scope. Ronald Mann writes that “securitization raises
difficult policy questions in part because it falls at the boundary between
those two spheres”268—the sphere of Congress’s power to enact bankruptcy
laws,269 on the one hand, and of states’ traditional control over basic issues
of commercial law, on the other.270 As such, the purpose of this section is
merely to identify this issue, and to include it in this Part’s sketch of possible
sites for reform of the true-sale doctrine.
A short-lived proposal to reform the bankruptcy code in the wake of
LTV Steel—proposed section 912271—corroborates this observation.
Proposed section 912 provides an example of an instance in which
substantive questions about the scope of bankruptcy estates potentially
involving securitized assets were considered for enactment in federal
bankruptcy law.272
Section 541 of the Bankruptcy Act defines property that belongs to the
bankruptcy estate.273 In 2001, efforts to reform the Bankruptcy Act included
an amendment to section 541 that would have removed from the bankruptcy
estate:
266. See Adler, supra note 265; Janger, supra note 10, at 1785-87. Cf. Plank, supra note
212.
267. Cf. Janger, supra note 10, at 1785-87.
268. Mann supra note 13, at 1806.
269. See Plank, supra note 212 (discussing the scope of, and limitations, on this power).
270. Id.
Mann observes that as globalization makes “the American business environment
ever more competitive, . . . state legislatures will more frequently . . . be pressed
to take sides in contentious issues about commercial finance.” Mann, supra note
13, at 1828. As such, “the time will come when federal bankruptcy courts must
draw the line somewhere between their deference to those enactments and the
need to enforce uniform federal bankruptcy policy.”
271. See Bankruptcy Reform Act of 2001, S. 220, H.R. 333, 107th Cong; H.R. 333, 107th
Cong. § 912(i) (2001). The securitization industry responded quickly to the holding in In re
LTV Steel Company, Inc., instigating this effort to enact federal true-sale safe harbor rules for
securitization. See Solomon, infra note 284, at 867.
272. Other proposals to reform priorities in bankruptcy that would affect bankruptcy
estates of securitization originators have also arisen. See, e.g., The Employee Abuse
Prevention Act of 2002, S. 2798, 107th Cong. (2002); H.R. 5221, 107th Cong. (2002)
(proposed by Senator Richard J. Durbin (D-Illinois) and Rep. William D. Delahunt (DMassachusetts) in an effort to give greater priority in bankruptcy to workers and retirees in
some circumstances).
273. 11 U.S.C. § 541 (2006).
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Any eligible asset274 (or proceeds thereof), to the extent that such
eligible asset was transferred by the debtor . . . to an eligible
entity275 in connection with an asset-backed securitization,276
except to the extent such assets (or proceeds or value thereof) may
be recovered by the trustee under section 550 by virtue of
avoidance under section 548(a). . . .277
Section 912 would have functioned similarly to the state ABS statutes—
it creates a safe harbor, from re-characterization—for securitization
transactions.278 Proposed section 912 was not quite as broad as the ABS
statutes, however. It set two conditions for the applicability of its safe
harbor: (i) the originator must represent and warrant under written agreement
that assets were sold to the SPE with intention of making them bankruptcy
remote, and (ii) at least one tranche of securities issued in the deal had to be
rated investment grade at the time of the initial issuance.279
While the safe harbor would not have extended to fraudulent transfers
under section 548(a), from the originator to the SPE, this exception did not
alter the provision’s overall intent. Fraudulent transfer law concerns
transfers that are made for too little value by an insolvent debtor. The
“reasonably equivalent value” tests in fraudulent transfer law prevent gifts
or transfers for minimal value to avoid creditors; they do not police the

274. The bill defines “eligible asset” as financial assets, cash and securities. Bankruptcy
Reform Act of 2001, supra note 44, at § 912(ii). This would include receivables.
275. “Eligible entity” is “an issuer” or “any “other entity engaged exclusively in the
business of acquiring and transferring eligible assets directly or indirectly to an issuer.”
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 2001, supra note 44, at § 912(ii). This would include a
securitization SPE.
276. The bill states:
The term ‘asset-backed securitization’ means a transaction in which eligible
assets transferred to an eligible entity are used as the source of payment on
securities, including, without limitation, all securities issued by governmental
units, at least one class or tranche of which was rated investment grade by one or
more nationally recognized securities rating organizations, when the securities
were initially issued by an issuer.
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 2001, supra note 44, at § 912(ii). See also Lipson, supra note 50.
277. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 2001, S. 220, H.R. 333, 107th Cong; H.R. 333, 107th
Cong. § 912(i) (2001).
278. See Jonathan C. Lipson, Enron, Asset Securitization and Bankruptcy Reform: Dead
or Dormant?, 11 J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 101 (2002); Lois R. Lupica, Revised Article 9, the
Proposed Bankruptcy Code Amendments and Securitizing Debtors and Their Creditors, 7
FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 321, 348–51 (2002); Jonathan C Lipson, Section 912 is
Dangerous, BUS. L. TODAY, July/August 2002, at 33, available at
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/blt/2002/07/two-views200207.authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/JW9F-TPK9].
279. See Schwarcz, infra note 282, at 359.
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boundary between sales and loans.280
By September 2002, Section 912 was deleted from both the House and
the Senate versions of the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention & Consumer
Protection Act of 2001,281 following Enron’s bankruptcy.282 Enron’s misuse
of securitization transactions283 created doubt about the desirability of section
912.284
Assessment of the desirability of amending the Bankruptcy Act with the
true-sale rules contained in proposed section 912 would follow the same
analysis as above, regarding the ABS statutes. Since “eligible assets” under
section 912 means financial assets, cash, and securities, the section would
have involved securitizations of replaceable assets—not essential assets—
for purposes of that analysis. In other words, section 912 reads more like a
bankruptcy law version of Texas’s UCC section 9-109(e) than of Delaware’s
Asset Backed Securities Facilitation Act.285 The point, here, is merely to
illustrate how, despite section 541 and the Butner principle, bankruptcy law
has been, and can be again, a potential cite for codifying true-sale rules.286
CONCLUSION: AN ADDITIONAL TAKE ON WHY THE TRUE-SALE DOCTRINE

280. See Letter from Allan Axelrod, Professor Emeritus, Rutgers School of Law –
Newark, et al., to Sen. Patrick Leahy and Rep. F. James Sensenbrenner (Jan. 23, 2002),
available at http://www.abi.org/abi-journal/legislative-update-proposed-rules-amendmentspublished-for-public-comment [https://perma.cc/QT43-PR4B].
281. Id. See Bankruptcy Reform Act of 2001, S. 220, H.R. 333, 107th Cong. § 912
(2001). See also Appendix I (full text of § 912 as it was introduced in the House on Jan. 30,
2001; available at https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-107hr333ih/pdf/BILLS107hr333ih.pdf [https://perma.cc/2VQX-9SMG]).
282. See Steven L. Schwarcz, The Impact of Bankruptcy Reform on “True Sale”
Determination in Securitization Transactions, 7 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 353 (2002). See
Jonathan C. Lipson, Enron, Asset Securitization and Bankruptcy Reform: Dead or Dormant?,
11 J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 101, 101 (2002); Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. 107-204, 116
Stat. 745; Steven L. Schwarcz, Enron and the Use and Abuse of Special Purpose Entities in
Corporate Structures, 70 U. CIN. L. REV. 1309, 1314-18 (2002); In re Enron Corp. Sec.,
Derivative & ERISA Litigation, 235 F. Supp. 2d 549, 610 (S.D. Tex. 2002).
283. Note that there are differences between “securitization” in Enron context, and the
securitizations (and true-sale doctrine) discussed here. See Schwarcz, supra note 167, and
Lipson, supra note 50, at 1269-71.
284. Stephen J. Lubben, Beyond True Sales: Securitization and Chapter 11, 1 N.Y.U. J.L.
& BUS. 89, 101 n.49 (2004); Dov Solomon, The Rise of a Giant: Securitization and the Global
Financial Crisis, 49 AM. BUS. L.J. 859, 866 n.36 (2012).
285. See supra text accompanying notes 194-97.
286. Cf. Douglas G. Baird and Anthony J. Casey, No Exit? Withdrawal Rights and the
Law of Corporate Reorganizations, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (2013); Jodie A. Kirshner, The
Bankruptcy Safe Harbor in Light of Government Bailouts: Reifying the Significance of
Bankruptcy as a Backstop to Financial Risk, 18 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 795 (2015).
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MATTERS
Since the 2008 financial crisis, public discourse has focused on federal
financial regulation to respond to negative externalities associated with
securitization. But choices of private-law rules also express policy
objectives and effectuate market governance.287 The state-level, private-law
infrastructure of financial markets is an under-explored source of regulatory
innovation.288 The rules governing true sales of receivables provide exactly
the type of context in which revisiting a private-law doctrine might improve
market governance.
The literature on securitization and bankruptcy remoteness provides
ample material for formulating approaches to true sales that could reflect and
express policy objectives surrounding the securitization market. Relating
this literature to the true-sale doctrine encourages a more informed, policydriven approach to these rules. At the same time, making explicit that truesale rules are about property—and relating them to the property concepts of
numerus clausus and exclusion—can facilitate coherence and normative
direction in formulating these rules.
In his work on finance and our republic, Robert Hockett has stated that
the “nemeses Jefferson and Hamilton . . . appear to have shared a view of the
place of remunerative individual endeavor and productive autonomy in an
enduring republic and of the place of finance in assuring that both remain
always available to productive-republican citizens.”289 He distinguishes a
“productive-republican” view of finance that he finds expressed in our
nation’s founding, from a “liberal” view that has become prevalent more
recently.290 The productive-republican view regards financial activity as
instrumentally good, enabling citizens to engage in market activity
consistent with collective republic-making.291 The liberal view, in contrast,
“takes market activity to be intrinsically good, if not indeed a matter of
inherent political-cum-moral right.”292 Hockett’s presentation of these
contrasting approaches to finance reminds us of the depth of implication that

287. Some commentators have related erosion of the true-sale doctrine to causes of the
2008 financial crisis. See Nate Oman, “Hayek, the True Sale Doctrine, and the Origins of
the Financial Crisis,” March 31, 2009, at
http://concurringopinions.com/archives/2009/03/hayek_the_true.html
[https://perma.cc/6ZYG-PJHR].
288. See Hughes, supra note 13. Cf. Janger, supra note 13; Mann, supra note 13.
289. Robert Hockett, Preliberal Autonomy and Postliberal Finance, 77 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROB. 105 at 105 (2014) (discussing “productive-republican” versus “liberal” understandings
of financial markets and regulation).
290. Id.
291. Id.
292. Id. at 106.
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legal rules governing market activity can have.
A legal doctrine at the heart of capital markets, such as the true-sale
doctrine, deserves substantive vetting. Virtually no legislative history
surrounds enactment of the ABS statutes293 and commentary on the commonlaw doctrine is sparse. Lawmakers who have reformed true-sale rules seem
to have done so in accord with the proclivities of those seeking to minimize
re-characterization risk without explication of efficiency or fairness
considerations surrounding that policy choice. If, ultimately, lawmakers
seek to enact safe-harbors in favor of investors, or to permit externalization
of costs onto non-adjusting creditors, they should do so with explicit
dedication to policy implications and with some conception of the function
and value of finance. Otherwise, we leave in disarray an area of law with
profound distributive and market effects.

293. See supra text accompanying note 190.

